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There are special techniques languages that are used in risk management in both domains 
of safety engineering and security engineering. The outputs, known as artifacts, of these 
techniques are separated from each other leading to several difficulties due to the fact that 
domains are independent and that there is no one unifying domain for the two. The problem 
is that safety engineers and security engineers work in separated teams from throughout the 
system development life cycle, which results in incomplete coverage of risks and threats. 
 
The thesis applies a structured approach to integration between security and safety by 
creating a SaS (Safety and Security) domain model. Furthermore, it demonstrates that it is 
possible to use goal-oriented KAOS (Knowledge Acquisition in automated Specification) 
language in threat and hazard analysis to cover both safety and security domains making 
their outputs, or artifacts, well-structured and comprehensive, which results in 
dependability due to the comprehensiveness of the analysis. 
 
The structured approach can thereby act as an interface for active interactions in risk and 
hazard management in terms of universal coverage, finding solutions for differences and 
contradictions which can be overcome by integrating the safety and security domains and 
using a unified system analysis technique (KAOS) that will result in analysis centrality. 
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Turvaliste ja ohutute süsteemide arendamine KAOS meetodi kasutamisel 
 
Lühikokkuvõte 
Käesolevas magistritöös rakendatakse struktuurset lähenemist, turvalisuse ja ohutuse 
integreerimiseks läbi SaS (Safety and Security) domeeni mudeli loomise, mis integreerib 
neid mõlemaid. Lisaks töö käigus näidatakse, et on võimalik kasutada eesmärgipõhist 
KAOS (Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Specification) keelt ohtude ja riskide 
analüüsiks, nii et kaetud saavad nii ohutus- kui ka turvadomeen, muutes nende väljundid e. 
artefaktid hästi struktureerituks, mille tulemusena toimub põhjalik analüüs ja suureneb 
usaldatavus. 
 
Võtmesõnad: Ohutusmudel, turvalisusmudel, usaldatavuse nõuded, eesmärgimudel, 
eesmärgipõhine modelleerimine, KAOS, infosüsteemide modelleerimine, takistus 
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction  
 
Our dependability on software in every aspect of our lives has exceeded the level that was 
expected in the past. We have now reached a point where we are currently stuck with 
technology, and it made life much easier than before. The rapid increase of technology 
adoption in the different aspects of life has made technology affordable and has led to an 
even stronger adoption in the society. 
 
As technology advances, almost every kind of technology is now connected to the network 
like infrastructure, automobiles, airplanes, chemical factories, power stations, and many 
other systems that are business and mission critical. Because of our high dependency on 
technology in most, if not all, aspects of life, a system failure is considered to be very 
critical and might result in harming the surrounding environment or put human life at risk. 
 
Challenges such as concepts, modelling language and methods used in the fields of safety 
and security arise during research on either field. The gap between the two field resulted 
from the fact that researched focuses on either one of those two fields alone, given that each 
has its own development tools and methods. However, the requirements of safety and 
security are similar in the fact that they are concerned about what the system-to-be should 
and should not do. 
 
The scope of the thesis is between safety engineering, security engineering, and risk 
management for both of them (Figure 1.1). This thesis will address the information system 
security risk management (ISSRM) domain model [Mayer, 2009], as we have contributed 
in modifying the information safety risk management (ISRM) domain model [Firesmith, 
2003], the result of integrating the two domains is a safety and security (SaS) information 
domain model.  
 
After that, we will address each domain separately by running the example 
@RemoteSurgery on the security aspect that deals with information security system risk 
management (ISSRM) [Mayer, 2009] domain, a modified version of information safety risk 
management (ISRM) [Firesmith, 2003] domain on the safety aspect, and SaS that was 
produced in this thesis. 
 
Figure 1. 1 Scope of the thesis. 
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1.1 Research questions and contribution 
 
In the current thesis, we raise two research questions: 
 
RQ1: How could we possibly relate safety and security? 
 
Risk management process was the entry point for the integration process (Figure 1.1) as the 
interface interplays between safety requirements using information safety risk management 
domain model (ISRM) and security requirements using information system security risk 
management domain model (ISSRM) from the aspect of system functionality and what the 
system should and should not do. For that, we proposed the creation of an information 
domain model that integrates between safety and security, (SaS), and the implementation of 
risk management process that leads to dependability requirements (safety and security). 
 
RQ2: What is meant by extending modeling languages approach for safety and security 
risk management? 
 
The alignment between SaS domain model for hazard management with the modeling 
language KAOS, which has allowed for a better method to derive safety and security 
requirements in early stages from the beginning of the system development life cycle. The 
alignment between SaS domain model and KAOS enhances the cooperation and facilitates 
communication and interaction between stakeholders.  
 
1.2 Running Example 
 
The motivation behind choosing the @RemoteSurgery example is that it has focus on both 
safety and security perspectives, as they affect each other. This example shows what can 
happen even when the devices are not connected to the network  “In the summer of 2005, 
radiotherapy machines in Merseyside, England, and in Boston were attacked by computer 
viruses. It makes little sense to invest effort in ensuring the dependability of a system while 
ignoring the possibility of security vulnerabilities....”[Daniel et al., 2007]. In this example, 
risk on the security side can have a negative effect on safety and can ultimately lead to 
death.  
 
The example of @RemoteSurgery was chosen due to its closeness to real life [Deloitte, 
2013], which touches the safety side [Jung and Kazanzides, 2013] because any error in 
hardware stack console will lead to severe injury or the loss of human life, and the security 
side because the stack console is connected to the network [Marescaux, et Al., 2002]. These 
types of risks are also brought out in three following experiments: Operation Lindbergh 
[Marescaux, et Al., 2002], Operation Canada Tele-Surgeries  [Anvari  et al., 2005; Anvari, 
2007] and remote surgery experiment between Japan-Korea [Jumpei et al., 2006].   
 
 
Furthermore, @RemoteSurgery consoles devices run on an operating system like URObot 
[Fei, et al., 2001] that uses a Linux Red Hat 6.1 distribution using Fast Light Tool Kit 
(FLTK) in the GUI among other things. We realize that these systems can be infected with 
viruses and compromised like the rest of the systems, which affects safety.  
SaS; Safety software; Cyber-Security; cyber-physical; Cyber-physical system; Mobile cyber physical systems; 




Knowledge Acquisition for Automated Specification; KAOS; Obstacle safety; safety software; Reliability; dependability security; dependability safety ; 
resilience; resilience engineering; MBD; STPA; STPA-sec; STAMP;RE; Goal; SaS dependability Criteria 
The researchers [Baowei et al., 2001] have focused on safety in surgeries through 
evaluation and analysis in terms of the software and hardware used to operate the console. 
However  they did not ta e into account the console’s connectivity to the networ  in their 
evaluation and analysis. 
 
The following description is an extract from Operation Lindbergh [Marescaux, et al., 
2002], Operation Canada Tele-Surgeries [Anvari et al., 2005; Anvari, 2007], and 
experiment between Japan-Korea [Jumpei et al., 2006]. @RemoteSurgery consists of three 
main components; the patient information that will be shared, the master console that is 
located in the same operating theatre where the surgeon will be controlling the surgery on 
his side, and the slave console located next to the patient. The slave console receives 
commands from the operating surgeon sent from the master console. These commands are 
then executed on the patient’s  ody directly without any human interference  The third 
component is telecommunications technology used to link the master and slave console in 
order to transmit the video live feed to the operating surgeon and for the surgeon to send 
the operating commands to the slave console. Transmitting and receiving operations in this 
case are subject to packets loss, which puts the operation at risk; furthermore, there is also 
the risk of packets delay. 
 
Our goal is to address hazards from the safety aspect and threats from the security aspect in 
a single domain model that integrates the two aspects and performs hazard and threat 
analysis using KAOS as addressed by the researchers in Operation Lindbergh [Marescaux, 
et. Al., 2002], Operation Canada Tele-Surgeries [Anvari et al., 2005; Anvari, 2007], 
experiments between Korea and Japan [Jumpei et al., 2006]. 
 
1.3 Structure  
This thesis is composed of eight chapters as shown in (Figure 1.2).  
 
Chapters two, three, and five are similar in terms of organization. Each of these chapters is 
organized as follows: standards and domain models, hazard/risk management process, and 
finally, techniques languages. 
 
Chapter 2, titled “Safety Engineering”  addresses the standards followed  y our 
contribution in adapting information safety risk management (ISRM) domain to support the 
hazard/risk management process, and finally, safety modelling languages. 
 
Chapter 3  titled “Security Engineering”  addresses the information system security risk 
management (ISSRM) domain, followed by the hazard/risk management process, and 
finally security modelling languages. 
 
Chapter 4  titled “Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Specification” in running example 
‘@RemoteSurgery’. The example is run on ISSRM and ISRM, the alignment between 
KAOS and ISSRM. As a part of contribution we did the alignment between ISRM and 
KAOS. 
 
Chapter 5  titled “Common Method to  efine Security and Safety (SaS ”  is the result of 
the main contribution in integrating chapters 2 and 3. We addressed the standards and the 
SaS domain produced followed by hazard/risk management process and SaS modelling 
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languages. This chapter also includes an introduction on STAMP approach which is 
expanded upon in the appendices A, B, and C and a comparison between its results with the 
results of chapter 6 are discussed in chapter 7. 
 
Chapter 6, titled “Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Specification for SaS” in running 
example ‘@RemoteSurgery’. The example is run on SaS domain, the alignment between 
KAOS and SaS. The results of this process are discussed in chapter 7. 
 
Chapter 7, titled “Validation”  consists of the validation and comparison  etween the uses 
of KAOS in running example on the suggested SaS domain and the use of Systems-
Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) techniques languages (STPA; 
Appendix B, STPA-sec; Appendix C) running the same example (Chapter 6) on SaS 
domain. 
 
Chapter 8, we provides our conclusions, including limitations of the study and future 
perspectives. 
 
Appendix A, is an extension of the STAMP Approach section 5.5 in chapter 5. This 
appendix addresses the Alignment between the concepts of STAMP Approach and SaS 
domain model and detailed explanation on the use of STAMP approach concept using the 
SaS domain model in running the example ‘@RemoteSurgery’. 
 
Appendix B, titled “STPA process for safety” running example ‘@RemoteSurgery’ 
System-Theoretic Process Analysis for safety (STPA) safety corner. This appendix is an 
extension to chapter 5, the STAMP approach section 5.5, where we use STPA Process for 
safety in running the example “@RemoteSurgery” that has  een discussed in chapter 6  y 
KAOS, in the safety side section  We also use the same description of “running example 
‘@RemoteSurgery’” and run it on the safety side using STPA Safety  The results of this 
process are discussed in chapter 7. 
 
Appendix C, titled “STPA-sec process for security” running example ‘@RemoteSurgery’ 
System-Theoretic Process Analysis for security (STPA-sec) security corner. This appendix 
is an extension to chapter 5, the STAMP approach section 5.5, where we use STPA-sec 
Process for security in running the example “@RemoteSurgery” that has  een discussed in 
chapter 6 by KAOS, in the security side section. We also use the same description of 
“running example ‘@RemoteSurgery’” and run it on the security side using STPA-sec. The 
results of this process are discussed in chapter 7. 
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Figure 1. 2 Structure of the thesis. 
 
 
1.4 Summary of thesis in six steps 
Summary of thesis in six steps as shown in (Figure 1.3) 
 
Step 1: KAOS graphical modelling language were used in running the example 
‘@RunningSurgery’ on the safety side in respect to both the information safety risk 
management (ISRM) [Firesmith, 2003] domain model and the hazard management process 
and we did the alignment of the ISRM domain model elements and the KAOS modelling 
language. 
 
Step 2: KAOS modelling languages were used in running the example ‘@RunningSurgery’ 
on the security side in respect to both the information system security risk management 
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(ISSRM) [Mayer, 2009] domain model and the risk management process and we did the 
alignment of the ISSRM domain model elements and the KAOS modelling language. 
 
Step 3: We propose a solution through the creation of a (SaS) Safety and Security 
information domain model that integrates safety and security domains, giving a better 
opportunity for comparison and integration to find a middle ground between the two 
domains, as well as unifying definitions through their mappings onto the common concepts. 
 
Step 4: KAOS modelling language were used in running the example ‘@RunningSurgery’ 
on the security and the safety sides in respect to both the SaS domain model and the hazard 
management process and we did the alignment of the SaS information domain model 
elements and the KAOS modelling language. 
 
Step 5: We chose the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) 
approach and its modelling language, namely System-Theoretic Process Analysis for safety 
(STPA), on the safety side and System-Theoretic Process Analysis for Security (STPA-sec) 
on the security side in order to be the base of the experiment in comparison to what was 
done in steps 3 and 4. 
The concepts of SaS domain model were applied on STAMP approach using the same 
example ‘@RemoteSurgery’. 
STPA modelling language were used in running the example ‘@RunningSurgery’ on the 
safety side in respect to both the STAMP domain model and the STPA hazard management 
process. 
STPA-sec modelling language were used in running the example ‘@RunningSurgery’ on 
the security side in respect to both the STAMP domain model and the STPA-sec hazard 
management process. 
 
Step 6: We now have the SaS domain model and its own modelling language, KAOS-SaS, 
which resulted from the steps 3 and 4. We also have STAMP approach and its modelling 
language, STPA and STPA-sec that resulted from step 5. 
 
Each domain and its own modelling language has been explained along with usage and 
execution on the same example ‘@RemoteSurgery’ followed by the comparison and 
validation on how and to what extent each domain and its modelling language are covering 
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Figure 1. 3 Summary of the thesis in six steps. 
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CHAPTER 2 Safety Engineering 
 
“The systems engineering discipline concerned with lowering the risk of unintentional (i.e., 
accidental) unauthorized harm to defended assets to a level that is acceptable to the 
system’s stakeholders by preventing, detecting, and properly reacting to such harm, 
mishaps (i.e., accidents and safety incidents), system-internal vulnerabilities, system-
external unintentional abusers, hazards, and safety risks.” [Firesmith, 2012] 
 
We will address the standards used in safety engineering Moreover, we contributed in the 
adjustment of the domain model of information safety risk management (ISRM) [Firesmith, 
2003] model by adding definitions for each artefact and adjusting it to comply with the 
work being done. We have also addressed safety modelling languages and chose HAZOP 
and BDMP as each of these two languages has its own techniques for dealing with risk 
management.  
 
2.1 Software Safety Engineering Standards 
 
It is essential, when implementing critical safety software, that this software is able to 
verify whether the system is safe or not and it is usually on a high level of verifiability. This 
is not  an easy process as the software systems could be complicated and therefore it would 
be difficult to determine whether they are truly safe or not. The goals of such standards can 
be summarized [Hauge, 2001] in the three following points: 
 
Development is the process of putting the new system through the process of defining 
potential risks and threats in order to discover them and set out a methodology to avoid 
them. 
Operational management it is the process of evaluating risks and threats that have been 
controlled to reach a higher degree of safety for the system. It is also setting out a clear 
guide that explains every part of the system and how it to interact with it, and training the 
users on how to use the system. 
Certification is the process of proving that the claimed system has been developed is a 
safety system and determining the degree of its safety. 
 
 
DO-178B a standard developed by the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics in 
1985, the final draft of [DO-178B] and ED-12B was released in 1992. The full name is 
Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification. 
There are five levels in DO-178B ranging from A to E. These levels describe the 
consequences of a potential failure: catastrophic, hazardous-severe, major, minor, or no 
effect. 
This certification forces all software requirements to be mapped to a software level 
describing at which level of criticality the software functions at in possible failure 
situations. Requirements mapped to a level other than level E are subject to further 
certification using DO-178B. Requirements mapped with higher levels need very careful 
planning, coding, and testing. Furthermore, they require more secure configuration 
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management and to higher levels of quality assurance. The success of producing certified 
product safety relies on the software levels of DO-178B. 
 
DO-178B divides the software life cycle process into five main processes. Software 
planning, development, verification, configuration management, and quality assurance. In 




IEC 61508 the IEC 61508 standard [IEC 61508, 1998] developed in 1985 and released in 
1999 by The International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) and has the full name 
‘Functional Safety of programma le electronic systems'  
 
IEC 61508 is a generic approach involved or used in several industries. Currently, the 
process industry is developing its own standard that complies with its own specifications 
for application of Safety Instrumented Systems.  IEC 61508 proposes an overall safety 
lifecycle for software and hardware and addresses all stages. In IEC 61508, safety integrity 
requirements of the safety functions are specified in four levels in order to allocate them to 
the Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic (E/E/PE) safety-related systems. 
 
MOD 00-56 standard [MOD 00-56, 1991] was produced by the UK Ministry of Defence in 
 99   The full name is ‘ efence Standard 00-56: Hazard Analysis and Safety Classification 
of the Computer and Programmable Electronic System Elements of Defence Equipment’. It 
describes several forms of hazard and risk analysis to be performed. It is required to carry 
out a change hazard analysis whenever a change to the system occurs [Hauge, 2001]. 
 
This standard gives guidelines for identification, evaluation, and recording the hazards of a 
system in order for to determine the maximum tolerable risk from it, and to facilitate the 
achievement of a risk that is as low as reasonably practicable and below the maximum 
tolerable level. This activity will determine the safety criteria and a reasonable and 
acceptable balance between reducing risk and the cost of that risk reduction. 
 
MOD 00-56 uses four classes of risk using categories of accident severity and six 
probability levels to the hazard to determine the class of the risk: intolerable, undesirable, 
tolerable. However, if the system is being used in a new environment, the hazard 
classification must be re-performed. There are five approaches to reduce the risk associated 
with a hazard: re-specification, redesign, incorporation of safety features, incorporation of 
warning devices, and operating and training procedures [Hauge, 2001]. 
 
2.2 Domain Model of Information Safety Risk Management  
 
In the studies conducted by [Firesmith, 2003; Firesmith, 2004; Firesmith, 2005;  Firesmith, 
2006; Firesmith, 2012] focused on developing the definitions for safety and security 
domains and comparing them to one another and survivability engineering. They also 
created a unified definition that includes safety, security, and survivability engineering 
called defensibility and from that created information models using UML class and 
founded relationships and definitions between safety engineering and security engineering. 
However, in the PhD thesis by [Mayer, 2009] included comments on work proposed by 
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Firesmith that “proposed process does not rely on a risk- ased approach” which serves as a 
motive to create our own domain that works depending on a risk-based approach. (Table 
2.2) for Summary of the frameworks. 
 
Firesmith [Firesmith, 2003] distinguishes particularly harm coming from Intentional and 
Unintentional source. He then introduces the artifact of defensibility that is defined as the 
composition of both safety and security, and that is therefore closely related to the scope of 
our work. 
 
The researchers Axelrod and Mayer commented on Information Safety Risk Management 
domain model (ISRM) [Firesmith, 2003]. Mayer [Mayer, 2009] said that the ISRM domain 
does not deal with risk management process while Axelrod [Axelrod, 2012] argued that the 
concepts of this domain, especially the description of the definitions intentional and 
unintentional and said that the safety domain should "Prevent the harmful impact of both 
accidental and intended hazardous events rather than protect individuals from harm ". 
 
The reason behind building ISRM domain model is trying to narrow between it and already 
existing models of security, which will be demonstrated in the security engineering chapter. 
The safety domain model is easily amenable to hazard analysis and supporting requirement 
engineering. (Figure 2.1) shows basic definitions on safety engineering like risk, hazard, 
accident, asset, and vulnerability that have a strong bond with requirement engineering 
definitions like safety goal, policy and requirement. This explains the public safety and risk 
analysis methodologies in terms of vulnerabilities, hazards, accidents, and assets. 
Definitions in (Figure 2.1) are as follows 
 
 
Figure 2. 1 ISRM Domain Model, (Adapted from [Firesmith, 2003]). 
 
 
Asset the Common Criteria  CC   0    define an asset as an “entity that the owner of the 
target of evaluation places value upon”  Also addresses  oth  ISO/IEC F IS  7799   005  
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and [ISO/IEC 13335-    004  consider “anything that has value to the organization” an 
asset. And [NIST SP 800- 6   00   “major application  general support system, high 
impact program, physical plant, mission critical system, or a logically related group of 
systems’’ an asset  
 
Therefore we categorised “system” under “Asset” to descri e all types of assets of value to 
the organisation. These systems differ from a company to another whether it’s (a   a  
software, IT infrastructure, users, or strategic plan, etc.). 
Taking the surrounding environment into account as in [Zave and Jackson, 1997] where the 
relationship between the system and the environment “is the portion of the real world 
relevant to the software development project”   And defines the machine “is a computer-
based machine that will be constructed and connected to the environment, as a result of the 
software development project.” Furthermore, Jackson and Zave [Zave and Jackson, 1997] 
go in detail on requirement engineering regarding the environment as when being in an 
indicated mood the environment is described in absence of the machine and in this case the 
description comes from a domain knowledge. On the other hand, when in an optative 
mood, the environment is described as seen fit and as hoped to be achieved when 
connecting the machine to the environment which is then called requirements in this case.  
 
We prefer to use the definition [ISO/IEC FDIS 17799, 2005] and [ISO/IEC 13335-1, 2004] 
because it is a broad definition that includes the technical and theoretical aspects like 
organization reputation and the managerial aspect of organisations. We consider safety to 
be a system property. Safety can only be regarded as a characteristic of a system. it is not a 
characteristic of the machine alone. 
Valuable asset that may be damaged or destroyed if an accident occurs, e.g. environmental 
disruptions (accidental disruptions, man-made, natural). Human and operator errors 
(mistakes by human operators). 
 
Harm is a significant damage, usually associated with an asset that is caused by an 
accident (when dealing with safety engineering) or is due to an attack (when dealing with 
security engineering). 
 
Safety risk in the introduction report in [NASA, 1997], Risk is “The com ination of the 
probability (qualitative or quantitative) that a program or project will experience an 
undesired event and the consequences, impact, or severity of the undesired event were it to 
occur ”  And from the safety aspect is quantitative. This representation resulted from the 
probability of an accident occurring when a system runs in its environment. From this 
representation accidents are categorised based on the degree of harmness like disastrous or 
severe for example. 
 
Vulnerability is a weakness in the system that is increases the probability of an accident 
occurrence that will result in causing harm. This weakness can be in any of the stages of a 
system development life cycle such as design, implementation, integration, or deployment. 
 
Accident In the introduction report of  NASA  997  “An unplanned event or series of 
events that results in death, injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of equipment, 
property, or damage to the environment; a mishap”   IEEE    8  we can also say that root 
causes always exist and contribute in the probability of having a sequence of events that 
would end up with accidents. 
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Hazard In the introduction report of [NASA 1997] “Existing or potential condition that can 
result in, or contribute to, a mishap or accident ” 
The  FAA   998  order define hazard as a “condition  event  or circumstance that could 
lead to or contri ute to an unplanned or undesired event ” 
 
Hazard Control in the introduction report of  NASA  997  “Means of reducing the ris  of 
exposure to a hazard. This includes design or operational features used to reduce the 
li elihood of occurrence of a hazardous effect or the severity of the hazard”  
 
The [ISO 14971, 2012] order define Hazardous Situation “circumstance in which people  
property  or the environment are exposed to one or more hazard(s  ” 
Hazardous Situation = Hazard + Sequence of events [ISO 14971, 2012] 
 
Hazard Mitigation in the introduction report of [NASA 1997] “Any action that reduces or 
eliminates the risk from hazards.” 
 
We also notice that the control process in safety is not limited compared to that in security. 
This is because in safety security, mitigation; control comes from outside the environment 
which could be resulted from training the employees, or from the rules and regulations. 
 
Safety mechanism are the decisions or plan required to achieve one or more safety 
requirements and taking them into account throughout the system development life cycle 
phases, which will decrease the harm caused in case of accidents. 
 
Safety requirement according to the definition in [Zave and Jackson, 1997], A 
requirement is an optative property, intended to express the desires of the customer 
concerning the software development project. A specification  is an optative property that 
specifies a required amount of Safety Objectives (Table 2.1) also called Quality subfactor 
[Firesmith, 2012; Romani et al., 2009], intended to be directly implementable and to 
support satisfaction of the requirements.  
 
 
Table 2.  1 Concepts Safety Criteria (Safety Quality subfactor) . (Adapted from [Firesmith, 2012; 













Safety policy multiple requirements are interdependent and interact with one another. 
These interactions may be positive, negative. The safety policy states, In the event of 
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conflict between security requirement and safety requirement it shall always be presumed 
that safety has precedence. 
 
Safety Goal it is the dire need to achieve the highest level of safety in a system as possible. 
This need comes from the strong motivation behind creating a safety policy if the goal was 
to achieve high levels of safety in a system where safety policy always gives priority to 
safety requirements in case of requirements conflicts. 
 
Table 2.  2 Summary of the frameworks and standards safety engineering. 
Reference Safety Oriented Risk-Based 
Approach 
RE Approach 
DO-178B ++ ++ -- 
Firesmith -+ -+ ++ 
EC 61508 ++ ++ -- 
MOD 00-56 ++ ++ -- 
Legend: 
++: Completely covered and at the core of the document 
+- : Partially covered or not playing a central role 
--:  Not covered 
 
2.3 ISRM Hazard Risk Management Process 
 
Information safety domain model put by [Firesmith, 2003] that addresses safety 
engineering and the creation of a conceptualised domain model specific for safety and 
discussed its concepts. He had also done the same for security integrated them into what he 
called survivability engineering. These domains are built similarly to the system 
development life cycle as it mainly depends on regular activities of requirement 
engineering for both safety engineering and security engineering. However, the steps or the 
risk management processes produced by Firesmith are not clear in the information models. 
 
We elicited these six steps process (Figure 2.2) for risk management from the safety 
perspective through [Axlerod, 2012; Redmill, 1999] standard IEC 61508 and [Brazendale, 
1995] IEC 1508 standard that explain the phases of the hazard risk management process 
from the safety perspective taking into account the respect to the safety information models 
[Firesmith, 2003]. The following steps are (a to f) summarised are follows: 
 
(a) Scope and asset identification the first step consists of the process of searching for 
stakeholders to address the safety implications, at the system level and their environments 
(a.k.a. physical, social, standards) for the purpose of defining the scope. After that, the 
assets of value for the company as well as the assets related to safety engineering need to be 
identified. The output of this step is the definition of the scope and its relation to the system 
and the environment and a priority list and rankings of assets to be secured from a safety 
perspective starting with the assets of the highest priority. 
 
(b) Determination of quality factor objective in this step, we set a quality criterion for 
every asset identified in the previous step, while each asset has its own characteristics, 
which requires the identification of safety goals for each of these assets as summarized in 
(Table 2.2). 
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(c) Hazard analysis and assessment the third step consists of the identification of existing 
and potential hazards that are likely to violate the safety goals resulting in accidents. 
Without doubt, these accidents will cause damage to assets. After identification, these 
hazards are evaluated and the degree of risk is measured using quantitative and qualitative 
analysis. At this stage, the defining the likelihood of occurrence, defining consequence 
categories, and risk matrix are produced and the result is full information on these hazards. 
After that, ALARP principle is implemented to measure the tolerance of each hazard 
[Redmill, 1999]. If the results are dissatisfying, the entire process has to be performed again 
starting from step (a), otherwise, the process proceeds to step (d). 
 
(d) Hazard treatment in this step the decision is made regarding these hazards. These 
types of risk treatments are divided to three categories: prevention, reducing, or retaining 
risk. 
 
(e) Quality requirements definition depending on the decision(s) made and choosing the 
measures in the previous step, we derive the safety mechanism, and the strategic decision 
that will satisfy safety requirement to define Safety Integrity Level (SIL) target that 
complies to what has been chosen in order to mitigate and control harms resulting from 
hazards. 
 
(f) Constraint selection and implementation in this step, the decisions made regarding 
hazards are implemented by setting constraints that comply to SIL target in parallel with 
implementing safeguards for unintentional hazards. To ensure the compatibility of the 
chosen quality criterion for each asset individually by referring to the safety policy. 
 
Safety systems are dynamic and interactive resulting in having unintentional hazards. The 
upgrading process is continuous as the main objective of this step is to monitor the residual 
risk and its compliance to the standards [Brazendale, 1995]. 
 
2.4 Safety Modelling Languages  
 
Most of the techniques mentioned in this research were built specifically for a certain 
industry, for example Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) that was built and used in chemical 
industry [IEC61882, 2002], Fault Tree Analysis that was built and used in nuclear industry 
[Vesely et al., 1981], and The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis that was used in rocket and 
automobile industries. It is important to note that each and every technique built and used 
in a specific industry has its own threat analysis and mathematical formulas even if they all 
under the safety engineering umbrella. 
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Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) technique is used in identifying and analysing the 
threats and ris s that can arise during the developed system’s operations  This technique is 
flexible mainly because of the use of guidewords that are adjusted depending on the 
industrial environment it will be working in. This has resulted in the spread of using 
guidewords brainstorming process in industries other than the chemical industry. (Table 
2.3) shows guideword interpretations for attributes of Messages. 
It is possible to apply HAZOP during an early stage of system construction where the main 
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Table 2.  3 Example of Suggested guideword interpretations for attributes of Messages. (Case study 
from [Klaus  et al., 2004]). 
Entity=Message 
Attribute Guide word Interpretation 
predecessor/ 
successor 
No Message is not sent when it should be. 
Other than Message sent at wrong time. 
As well as Message sent at correct time and also at 
incorrect time. 
Sooner Message sent earlier within message 
sequence 
than intended. 




sender/ receiver No Message not sent when intended (to any 
destination). 
Other than Message sent to wrong object. 
As well as Message sent to correct object and also an 
incorrect object. 
Reverse Source and destination objects are 
reversed. 
More Message sent to more objects than 
intended. 




HAZOP studies The recommended steps in a HAZOP study, which is based on examining 
design representations of a system, are: identifying each entity in the design representation; 
descripting the interaction between the components of a component affecting its operation 
like flow of data for example; applying guidewords to attributes by investigating deviations 
from the design; investigating the causes and consequences of each deviation; and 




Boolean logic Driven Markov Processes (BDMP) technique Several researches 
 Cam ac d s and  ouissou   0 0  focused on finding new methods to deal with modeling 
safety and security interdependencies with BDMP, a technique that depends on graphical 
modeling and mathematical formalism (Figure 2.3). However, using this newly founded 
method is impractical because it requires knowledge and hands-on experience because it is 
very much similar to attack tree and fault-tree with Markov processes.  
 
The ability to formulate BDMP enables modelling dynamic feature with triggers. BDMP is 
used to model the different combinations of events that may lead to undesired events, 
which can be system failure for example. In a tree, these events represent the leaves. Each 
leaf is associated to a “triggered Mar ov process” that models its different states  This 
process can  
 
SaS; Safety software; Cyber-Security; cyber-physical; Cyber-physical system; Mobile cyber physical systems; 




Knowledge Acquisition for Automated Specification; KAOS; Obstacle safety; safety software; Reliability; dependability security; dependability safety ; 
resilience; resilience engineering; MBD; STPA; STPA-sec; STAMP;RE; Goal; SaS dependability Criteria 
 
 
Figure 2. 3                                                                               
Bouissou, 2010]). 
  
be in a Required and Not-Required mode or in an Idle or Active mode for safety-related and 
security-related leaves respectively. This method, besides other outputs, gives quantitative 
results including the sequences that most probable lead to unwanted events. 
 
BDMP is suitable for risk evaluation process and it consists of three phases:  
1. Context definition we define the scope and boundaries of a system and the nature of 
the risks will be examined. 
2. System description addressing risks documenting the scheme of the system intended 
to be built and its functions. 
3. Risk estimation this phase consists of three sub-phases: analysing data, representing 
and modelling system related risks, and exploiting the model. 
Choice of prevention and mitigation: this phase depends on quantitative and qualitative risk 
estimation. 
 
The newly founded technique was derived from a real case study used in [Kriaa et al., 
2012] where the focus was on modeling case study about transporting a polluting substance 
with BDMP hoping towards more formal risk assessments. 
 
We will use KAOS language in chapter 4 section 4.3 to represent and run the example 
@RemoteSurgery in the safety side. 
2.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we have addressed the safety standards followed by our contribution in 
adapting information safety risk management (ISRM) domain to support the hazard 
management process, and finally, safety modelling languages. And the ISSRM domain and 
hazard management process will be used in running the example @RemoteSurgery using 
KAOS modelling languages from the safety side. 
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CHAPTER 3 Security Engineering 
 
“The systems engineering discipline concerned with lowering the risk of intentional (i.e., 
malicious) unauthorized harm to defended assets to a level that is acceptable to the 
system’s stakeholders by preventing, detecting, and properly reacting to such harm, 
civilian misuses (i.e., attacks and security incidents), system-internal vulnerabilities, 
system-external intentional civilian abusers, threats, and security risks.” [Firesmith, 2012] 
 
 
Security engineering also includes the organizations goals, strategies, tools, policies, rules, 
regulations, methodologies and operations that are taken into consideration throughout the 
system development process to protect it from threats that might occur both from internal 
and external environments [Bishop, 2004]. The core of security engineering can be 
summarised in confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). 
 
3.1 Domain Model of Information System Security Risk Management  
 
Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) is a methodology that focuses on 
issues related to information systems security risk management. The model is defined after 
surveying risk management, the security related standards, risk management methods, and 
software engineering [Mayer, 2009;  Mayer et al., 2007]. The domain model shown in 
(Figure 3.1) supports security modelling languages alignment that also improves security 




Figure 3. 1 ISSRM Domain Model, (Adapted from [Mayer, 2009]). 
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The reason why we chose ISSRM model is because of what Mayer [Mayer, 2009] has 
shown us in the ISSRM domain model covering and intersecting with other security risks 
management domains, which can be adapted to work with standards and domains such as 
CORAS [Vraalsen et al., 2007], CRAMM [Insight Consulting, 2003], OCTAVE [Alberts 
and Dorofee, 2001], MEHARI [CLUSIF, 2007], and NIST 800-30 [NIST SP 800-30, 
2002]. 
 
Here, the principles and definitions that have been extracted and adapted by Mayer [Mayer, 
2009]  from the following standards ISO/IEC, AS/NZS, ISRM [Firesmith, 2003], NIST 
800-30 and will be commented on. It is important to mention that the standard AS/NZS is 
adopted and used in ISO/IEC Guide 73 definitions so there is no real addition to AS/NZS 
standard. Definitions in (Figure 3.1) are as follows according to ISSRM [Mayer,2009]. 
 
Asset "anything that has value to the organisation and is necessary for achieving its 
objectives. Examples: technical plans; project management process; architectural 
competences; operating system; Ethernet network; people encoding data; system 
administrator; air conditioning of server room. 
NOTE: This concept is the generalisation of the business asset and IS asset concepts." 
 
Business asset "information, process, skill inherent to the business of the organisation, that 
has value to the organisation in terms of its business model and is necessary for achieving 
its objectives. 
Examples: technical plans; structure calculation process; architectural competences." 
 
IS asset "a component or part of the IS that has value to the organisation and is necessary 
for achieving its objectives and supporting business assets. An IS asset can be a component 
of the IT system, like hardware, software or network, but also people or facilities playing a 
role in the IS and therefore in its security. 
Examples: operating system; Ethernet network; people encoding data; system 
administrator; air conditioning of server room." 
 
Since we are speaking from the security perspective, we need to categories each asset 
depending on its needs according to the confidentiality, integrity and availability levels. 
This will help us determine the risks each asset will face, separately. 
 
Security criterion (also called security property; security need) "property or constraint on 
business assets characterising their security needs. Security criteria act as an indicator to 
assess the significance of risk. Security criteria are most often confidentiality, integrity and 
availability, but sometimes, depending on the context, some other specific criteria might be 
added, like authenticity, non-repudiation or accountability." 
 
Risk "the combination of a threat with one or more vulnerabilities leading to a negative 
impact harming one or more of the assets. Threat and vulnerabilities are part of the risk 
event and impact is the consequence of the risk. 
Examples: a cracker using social engineering on a member of the company, because of 
weak awareness of the staff, leading to non-authorised access on personal computers and 
loss of integrity of the structure calculation process; a thief penetrating the company's 
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building because of lack of physical access control, stealing documents containing sensitive 
information and thereby provoking loss of confidentiality of technical plans." 
 
We agree with AS/NZS definition, as it is more comprehensive on the fact that it is possible 
for a risk to be either positive or negative. For example, enterprises usually take the risk but 
this risk is under control and is a positive risk. Furthermore, the ISO/TC 262 definition 
mentions that the negative risk is closer and more suitable for safety engineering than 
security engineering. 
 
Impact "the potential negative consequence of a risk that may harm assets of a system or 
an organisation, when a threat (or an event) is accomplished. The impact can be described 
at the level of IS asset (data destruction, failure of a component, etc.) or at the level of 
business assets, where it negates security criteria, like for example: loss of confidentiality 
of an information, loss of integrity of a process, etc. 
Examples: password discovery (IS level); loss of confidentiality of technical plans (business 
Level)." 
 
Event "the combination of a threat and one or more vulnerabilities. 
Examples: a cracker using social engineering on a member of the company, because of 
weak awareness of the staff; a thief penetrating the company's building because of lack of 
physical access control." 
 
Vulnerability "characteristic of an Information System (IS) asset or group of IS assets that 
can constitute a weakness or a flaw in terms of IS security. It could be accidentally or 
intentionally exploited by a threat. 
Examples: weak awareness of the staff; lack of physical access control; lack of fire 
detection." 
 
The available definitions are considered to be clear definitions of vulnerability. However, 
in NIST SP 800-30, the definition explains very precisely what we are looking for; the 
addition of the word intentionally and also agreeing with Firesmith’s [Firesmith, 2003] 
definition. The word intentionally is what differentiates between safety engineering and 
security engineering. 
 
Threat "potential attack or incident, carried out by an agent that targets one or more IS 
assets and that may lead to harm to assets. A threat is usually composed of a threat agent 
and an attack method. 
Examples: a cracker using social engineering on a member of the company; a thief 
penetrating the company's building and stealing media or document." 
 
Firesmith addresses that the likelihood of a threat occurring while Common Criteria (CC’s ) 
definition is more comprehensive as it also includes threat agents. 
 
Threat agent "an agent that can potentially cause harm to assets of the IS. A threat agent 
triggers a threat and is thus the source of a risk. 
Examples: member of the personnel with little technical ability and time but possibly a 
strong motivation to carry out an attack; cracker with considerable technical ability, well-
equipped and strongly motivated by the money he could make. 
NOTE: It can be characterised by its type (usually human or natural/environmental) and by 
the way in which it acts (accidental or deliberate). In the case of an accidental cause, it can 
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also be characterised by exposure and available resources and in the case of a deliberate 
cause, it can also be characterised by expertise, available resources and motivation." 
 
Attack method "standard means by which a threat agent carries out a threat. 
Examples: system intrusion; theft of media or documents." 
 
Risk treatment "the decision of how to treat identified risks. A treatment satisfies a 
security need, expressed in generic and functional terms, and can lead to security 
requirements. Categories of risk treatment decisions include: 
Avoiding risk (risk avoidance decision) decision not to become involved in, or to withdraw 
from, a risk. Functionalities of the IS are modified or discarded for avoiding the risk; 
Reducing risk (risk reduction decision) action to lessen the probability, negative 
consequences, or both, associated with a risk. Security requirements are selected for 
reducing the risk; 
Transferring risk (risk transfer decision) sharing with another party the burden of loss 
from a risk. A third party is thus related to the (or part of the) IS, ensuing sometimes some 
additional security requirements about third parties; 
Retaining risk (risk retention decision) accepting the burden of loss from a risk. No design 
decision is necessary in this case. 
Examples: do not connect the IS to the Internet (risk avoidance); take measures to avoid 
network intrusions (risk reduction); take an insurance for covering the loss of service (risk 
transfer); accept that the service could be unavailable for 1 hour (risk retention). 
NOTE: Risk treatment is basically a shortcut for risk treatment decision." 
 
Security requirement a" condition over the phenomena of the environment that we wish to 
make true by installing the IS, in order to mitigate risks. 
Examples: appropriate authentication methods shall be used to control access by remote 
users; system documentation shall be protected against unauthorised access." 
 
It should be noted that it is difficult to answer the question of security requirements with 
yes or no because until now, security requirements are dealt with as whether they are non-
functional and the quality factor. For that, to get the best results, security requirements 
should be dealt with clarity and declare them in the beginning of the requirements gathering 
phase. 
 
Control (also called countermeasure or safeguard) "a designed means to improve security, 
specified by a security requirement, and implemented to comply with it. Security controls 
can be processes, policies, devices, practices or other actions or components of the IS and 
its organisation that act to reduce risk. 
Examples: firewall; backup procedure; building guard." 
 
 
Now that the domain of security engineering is covered, it is possible for us to jump to 







SaS; Safety software; Cyber-Security; cyber-physical; Cyber-physical system; Mobile cyber physical systems; 




Knowledge Acquisition for Automated Specification; KAOS; Obstacle safety; safety software; Reliability; dependability security; dependability safety ; 
resilience; resilience engineering; MBD; STPA; STPA-sec; STAMP;RE; Goal; SaS dependability Criteria 
 
3.2 ISSRM Risks Management Process 
 
The ISSRM domain model is responsible for the risk assessment management process 
through three main concepts discussed each separately by Mayer [Mayer, 2009] and they 
are as follows: (i) asset-related concepts; (ii) risk-related concepts; and (iii) risk treatment 
concepts. Using these three concepts, Mayer [Mayer, 2009] has put six steps (see Figure 
3.2) for the risk management process for the security requirement engineering. The 
following steps are (a to f) summarised as follows. 
 
 
Figure 3. 2 ISSRM Process, (Adapted from [Mayer, 2009]). 
 
 
(a) Context and asset identification the first process in this step is the search by multiple 
specialised teams for what is considered valuable for the company such as business assets 
and IS assets and what the processes the company wants to protect are. Ideally, a priority 
list of the assets that need security protection where said assets are arranged from the most 
important and are assigned the highest priority to the least important for the company.  
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(b) Determination of security objectives in this step, we set up a criterion for every asset 
identified in the previous step such that every asset has unique requirements, which 
requires security goals for every asset to be identified and are usually CIA. 
 
(c) Risk analysis and assessment the third step is all about identifying the existing and 
potential risks that will violate any of the security goals, which will result in damaging the 
assets. After that, the degree of this risk is evaluated and measured by quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. The measurement and evaluation stop when the results are satisfying.  
 
(d) Risk treatment decisions regarding risks that have been measured and evaluated in the 
previous step are made in this step. There are four types of risk treatment: avoiding, 
reducing, transferring, or retaining risk [Mayer, 2009]. 
 
(e) Security requirements definition depending on the decision(s) made in the previous 
step and choosing the risk treatment type, the identification and derivation of the security 
requirements that work with the has been chosen to mitigate threats resulting from risks. 
 
(f) Control selection and implementation  this is the last step of the process, in which, the 
implementation of the decisions made regarding mitigating and controlling risks and 
enhancing the information security level in the company through implementing 
countermeasures.  
 
3.3 Security Modelling Languages 
 
There are several kinds of technology used in the safety domain, in the analysis of the 
system development life cycle in general and specifically in analysing potential risks that 
will obstruct the system to be developed. If we take misuse-case from UML-based 
approaches, and KOAS from Goal-oriented approaches. We would like to point out an 
Alignment of misuse cases with ISSRM domain model has been built and the details can  e 
found in  Matulevičius et al    008   and also Alignment of ISSRM domain model and 
KAOS. The detail of the concept alignment between KAOS and ISSRM domain model can 
be found in [Mayer, 2009]. 
 
 
Misuse case diagrams, the conception of use cases is used to create and relate 
corresponding misuse cases used to address particularly security requirements [Sindre and 
Opdahl, 2005]. The functionality of a system is modeled in use cases focusing on 
interactions with users and responses from the system. Misuse cases extend the positive use 
cases with the negative ones to ensure eliciting security requirements.  
 
A use case and a misuse case are related using a directed association (Figure 3.3). If the 
association points from a misuse case to a use case has the stereotype <<threaten>> while if 
the association points from a security use case to a misuse case has the stereotype 
<<mitigate>>. It is stated that ordinary use cases represent requirements, security cases 
represent security requirements, and misuse cases represent security threats. The essence of 
the contained use cases is captured in an associated textual description since use case 
diagrams only give an overview of the system functionality.  
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Misuse cases are applicable to design a system that covers different security needs. It is 
possible to consider all three CIA goals. It incorporates common risk and threat analysis 
techniques. 
 
The process consists of five steps [Sindre and Opdahl, 2005], which consists of (1) Identify 
critical assets in the system, (2) Define security goals for each asset, (3) Identify threats for 
each security goal, (4) Identify and analyze risks for the threats, (5) Define security 




Figure 3. 3 Misuse Case Diagrams login online banking system, (adapted from[Chowdhury, 2011]). 
 
 
In both studies conducted by [Sindre and Opdahl, 2001; 2005] it is apparent that it is 
possible to derive a used technique from an existing one to cover the lack in that technique 
as they have managed to derive misuse case technique from the use-case technique and 
used it in security engineering.  
 
[Stålhane and Sindre, 2008] have prepared for an experimental comparison between use 
case diagrams and textual use cases in defining safety hazard identification. Their 
experiment concludes that using the textual use cases they were able to identify more 
failure modes or threats than use case diagrams. 
 
[Stålhane, et al., 2010] have conducted two separate experiments to compare between 
sequence diagrams and textual use cases in hazard identification to find out which is more 
appropriate in discovering risks that might appear during the early stages of the system 
SaS; Safety software; Cyber-Security; cyber-physical; Cyber-physical system; Mobile cyber physical systems; 




Knowledge Acquisition for Automated Specification; KAOS; Obstacle safety; safety software; Reliability; dependability security; dependability safety ; 
resilience; resilience engineering; MBD; STPA; STPA-sec; STAMP;RE; Goal; SaS dependability Criteria 
development life cycle and concluded that sequence diagrams are better for the 
identification of hazards than textual use cases. 
 
 
Mal-activity diagrams [Sindre, 2007] are based on misuse cases, malicious activities while 
actors are added to the diagrams to model potential attacks. 
 
It deals with behavioural features of the security problems. A basic way to build a mal-
activity diagram is to build a normal process and add the undesired behaviour against this 
process. This allows the addition of extra concepts (see Figure 3) such as Mal-Activity, 
Mal-swimlane and Mal-decision and defines MitigatingActivity and MitigatingLink to show 
the mitigation process. 
 
The process consists of four steps [Chowdhury et al., 2012], (see Figure 3.4 ) which 
consists of (1) Asset Identification, (2) Risk Analysis, Mal-swimlane "hacker" and 
malicious actor, (3) Identify threats for each security goal, (4) Define security requirements 




Figure 3. 4 Security Requirements Definition -risk treatment decision- example Online banking system 
,(Adapted from [Chowdhury et al., 2012]). 
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Mal-activity diagrams (MDA) is the best graphical system for modelling misuse-cases 
because it gives an overview on in-depth risk analysis through which events can be traced 
from the beginning to the end. Misuse-cases are better than MDA in using textual 
description and are also easier to use than MDA.  
 
We will use KAOS language in chapter 4 section 4.2 to represent and run the example 





In this chapter, we have addressed the information system security risk management 
(ISSRM) domain, followed by the risk management process, and finally security modelling 
languages. And the ISSRM domain and risk management process will be used in running 
the example @RemoteSurgery using KAOS modelling languages from the security side. 
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CHAPTER 4 Knowledge Acquisition in 
autOmated Specification 
 
KAOS were used in running the example ‘@RunningSurgery’ on the safety side in respect 
to both the information safety risk management (ISRM) [Firesmith, 2003] domain model 
and the hazard management process and we did the alignment of the ISRM domain model 
elements and the KAOS modelling language. 
 
KAOS were used in running the example ‘@RunningSurgery’ on the security side in 
respect to both the information system security risk management (ISSRM) [Mayer, 2009] 
domain model and the risk management process and we did the alignment of the ISSRM 
domain model elements and the KAOS modelling language. 
 
4.1 Graphical modelling Language 
 
Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Specification (KAOS) is a methodology for 
requirements engineering that ena les analysts to  uild requirements models and to derive 
requirement documents from KAOS models  The meta-model for KAOS has  een 
discussed in  Matulevičius et al    006   KAOS is a goal-oriented requirements engineering 
method intend to support the entire process of requirements analysis and elaboration – from 
high-level goals that need to be achieved to the requirements, objects and operations 
notions assigned to various agents notion in the composite system. It also provides a 
specification language, a tool support, and an elaboration method [Lamsweerde and Letier, 
2000]. 
 
The Goal model of KAOS looks like a tree that expresses relationships among goals of a 
system by showing how low-level goals contribute to higher-level goals and how, in this 
goal model, an AND-refinement link relates a parent goal to a set of sub-goals that must be 
satisfied for the parent goal for be satisfied. Using KAOS goal refinement patterns are 
considered an efficient way to build the model because proofs can be reused. These patterns 
are capable of reducing time and cost of goal model construction. 
 
An Obstacle is like a goal. However, the two are used to represent safety goals to reach 
obstacle treatment through the refinement into sub-obstacles. Each of these sub-obstacles is 
anchored with a new goal that works towards limiting and treating these obstacles. This 
method is implemented on the rest of the sub-o stacles until the goal “o stacle treatment” 
is achieved, which is the main goal and is located on the top level of the KAOS diagram.  
 
 
The following are definitions of elements found in KAOS (Figure 4.1) 
 
1. Goals descriptive milestones statements intended to be achieved.  
2. Agents active components like humans, devices, and legacy software that play a role 
towards achieving goals, Student; UniversityOfficeOfAdmission; 
CouncilScholarships 
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3. Obstacle a condition if satisfied, may prevent a goal from being achieved and is 
used in producing an anti-model that shows why and by whom the original model 
can be threatened; [Students NOT know about it Resolution]. 
4. Requirements a terminal goal that an agent is responsible for in the software to be 
developed, Maintain[Students]. 
5. Object any entity defined in the system. An object has features and relations, 
Students; CouncilScholarships; UniversityOfficeOfAdmission. 
6. Action the interaction between inputs and outputs within an object. Each action has 
pre-action, post-action, and trigger conditions, registeredAt; Grants; Partner. 
7. Operation model description of all behaviours whose requirements need to be 
fulfilled by agents. Behaviours are expressed in terms of operations that agents 
performed. Operations work on objects: they can create objects, trigger, state 
transitions of objects, and activate other operations [Respect‐IT, 2007], Student; 
CouncilScholarships; UniversityOfficeOfAdmission. 
8. Responsibility model the responsibility model contains all responsibility diagrams. 
Each diagram describes the requirements and expectations an agent is responsible 
for, or has been assigned to them. An agent is assigned to expectations in a goal 
model [Respect‐IT, 2007], UniversityOfficeOfAdmission.  
 
The following (Figure 4.1) addresses the main components of KAOS, which will be 




Figure 4. 1 KAOS Goal model. 
 
SaS; Safety software; Cyber-Security; cyber-physical; Cyber-physical system; Mobile cyber physical systems; 




Knowledge Acquisition for Automated Specification; KAOS; Obstacle safety; safety software; Reliability; dependability security; dependability safety ; 
resilience; resilience engineering; MBD; STPA; STPA-sec; STAMP;RE; Goal; SaS dependability Criteria 
Figure 4.1 shows an example of a simplified KAOS model. Goals are related to sub goals 
through goal refinement links. As an example, the figure shows that the goal Grant 
Scholarship is refined into the two conjoined sub goals Maintain [TheApplication], Avoid 
[DuplicateTheScholarship] and one Requirement Maintain[Students], Maintain 
[TheApplication] refined into the sub goal MeetTheCriterion. Agents are active objects, 
that is, they are capable of performing operations. Such agents may be software agents, 
systems, humans. Yellow circles represent refinements of a parent goal, Pink circles are 
used for expectation assignment to some agent and for Red circles are used for expectation 
responsibility to some agent. A potential conflict among goals is represented by red flash 
icon on a link connecting them. The DuplicateTheScholarship and FillTheApplication are 
potentially conflicting there; the applications submitted by students who did not receive 
scholarships are looked into, while those submitted by students who are benefiting from 
scholarships are dismissed.  An obstacle occurs here in the fact that there would be students 
who haven’t heard of said scholarship  ecause there are no information available on it on 
the university’s we site or even advertisements stating that applications are  eing accepted 
for a scholarship raising Obstacle[StudentsNOTknowAbout]. To avoid this obstacle, a 
method by which the probability of the obstacle occurring is minimised has to be founded 
through goal[Univ. publishes information about it], which will restrain students from 
receiving the scholarship. The university will be publishing information on the scholarship 
as well as sending this information via email to current students. Object model it provides 
the concept definitions used by the goals (GrantScholarship and FillTheApplication), 
Agents (Student, CouncilScholarships, UniversityOfficeOfAdmission). 
 
 
KAOS supports using semi-formal and linear formal specification language Linear 
Temporal Logic (LTL) to describe Goals, Obstacles and to perform logical proofs, which 
gives accuracy and reveals ambiguities. This is what sensitive and critical systems are in 
need for, which integrates between safety and security after identifying the requirements 
specifications of both and later reduced to formal languages that reveals complications 
resulted from achieving the goals of safety and security. Formal specifications can aid in 
correct design of system requirements specifications and improve the quality of system-to-
be [Nakagawa et al., 2007]. 
The semantic language of KAOS is necessary to ensure the correctness of the safety-critical 
requirements specifications described for developing the systems. 
KAOS semi-formal languages by using restricted natural language and formal language by 
using temporal logic language.  
 
4.1.1 Semi-Formal Specification Language 
 
In order to get the highest quality of requirements, a set of tools are used during the 
development life cycle of the system-to-be; semi-formal is one of these tools. Semi-formal 
is the use of the natural language in the description but in a narrow context relying on 
terminologies that suit the domain of the system to  e developed using “if conditional” and 
“ oolean logic”  (Ta le 4.1) summarises semi-formal.  
 
We will be using semi-formal on DuplicateTheScholarship goal in example (Figure 4.1). 
 
Avoid[DuplicateTheScholarship]: [If submit one application then] always not Rejected 
Semi-formal appears to  e giving a description of how the “Avoid” goal will  e achieved   
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Table 4. 1 Semi-Formal Language, Adapted from [Lamsweerde, 2009; Traichaiyaporn, 2013]. 
Achieve goals 
Semi-Formal  
Achieve[TargetCondition]: [If CurrentCondition then] eventually TargetCondition 
 
Obstacle by negating  Achieve goal  
[CurrentCondition and] always not TargetCondition   
 
Another form from Achieve goals by Cease a target condition 
Semi-Formal  








Avoid[BadCondition]: [If CurrentCondition then] always not BadCondition 
 
4.1.2 Formal Specification Language 
 
KAOS enables us from using formal languages to convert requirements specifications into 
linear temporal logic formulas (also called truth function) that are implemented on the goal. 
(Table 4.2) summarises formal. The following notations for TLT referencing are used 
(Figure 4.2). 
 
Table 4. 2 Semi-Formal Language, Adapted from [Lamsweerde, 2009; Traichaiyaporn, 2013]. 
Achieve goals 
Formal  
CurrentCondition   TargetCondition 
CurrentCondition   º TargetCondition 
Obstacle 
Formal  
CurrentCondition  □  TargetCondition 
 
Another form from Achieve goals by Cease a target condition 
Formal  
CurrentCondition  TargetCondition 








CurrentCondition  BadCondition 
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Figure 4. 2 Classical operators for TLT, from [Lamsweerde and Letier, 2000]. 
 
We will be using semantics from LTL operators (Figure 4.2) on GrantScholarship main 
goal in example (Figure 4.1). 
 
Goal Achieve [GrantScholarship] 
Concerns StSPEC, AppSPEC, DupSPEC 
RefinedTo Students, TheApplication, DuplicateTheScholaship 
FormalDef  St: Submit, app: Application a: student send (a,App)[ Available (a)  Duplicatea] 
 
Formal languages have precise notations based on mathematical concepts that work on 
revealing ambiguity around requirements. However, the existing formal languages in 
KAOS still need to be improved and enhanced. 
 
One of the challenges that face us is the need for a rigorous semantics specifications 
language when integrating the requirements specifications of safety and security 
requirements specifications, which will have a positive impact on reducing  the 
complexities of requirements specification, that were derived using anti-goal and obstacle 
notations  As pointed out  y Matulevičius  Matulevičius   008   several experiments were 
conducted on the use of KAOS elements and narrowing them to B specifications [Matoussi 
et al., 2009], VDM++ [Nakagawa et al., 2007], A-LTL for Adaptive Systems [Brown et al., 
2006] , and another work about modeling correct safety requirements using KAOS and 
Event-B done by [Traichaiyaporn, 2013].  
 
4.2 KAOS for Security 
 
This section addresses KAOS for security as well as artefact security threat (Threat 
obstacles element). For security requirements analysis and elaboration by the use Goals 
KAOS element, the goal notion allows the expression of security requirements patterns in 
terms of anti-goals notion and vulnerabilities of the system that is being studied. These 
patterns can also include a definition of the solution, or counter measure, to the attack in 
terms of goals that avoid a given vulnerability.  
 
4.2.1 Running example - Security Side 
 
The example @RemoteSurgery that was mentioned previously in section 1.2 and  ISSRM 
Risk management process introduced in section 3.2 containing six steps and implement 
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(a) Context and asset identification  
This step is done through the definition of goals and their refinement in the KAOS goal 
model, as depicted in (Figure 4.3) The main goal studied in the example is Achieve[Record 
Confidentiality], which is refined in the context domain property 
DoctorsWorkingForRemoteSurgery and the sub-goals AccessMedicalRecord associated to 
the agent RemoteDoctors, SharingMedicalRecord associated to the agent LocalDoctors and 
ReadRecordByAuthorisedDoctors. More details about the IS are given in the operation 
model SharingMedicalRecord.  
The goal SharingMedicalRecord is associated to the agent LocalDoctors. He also performs 
other operations (Select Date StartAndEndSharing, Select RemoteDoctors and Select 
MedicalRecord). The objects are used to support goals, here object is DatabaseOfDate, 
NameDoctors and MedicalRecord. 
 
(b) Determination of security objective 
Figure 4.3, the determination of security objectives is done in the same model and generally 
in the same time as the elicitation of other goals. ReadRecordByAuthorisedDoctors is an 
example of security objective; Security need, meaning that we need the CIA of 
MedicalRecord; HealthcareRecord; PatientData. 
 
(c) Risk analysis and assessment 
We elaborate security threat by negating the goal ReadRecordByAuthorised to obtain the 
main Obstacles UserNameVeryWeak and PasswordVeryWeak (Figure 4.4). We elaborate 
by Obstacle Security Threat analysis to refined the main Obstacles to one sub-obstacle 
UseSocialEngeeringToLearnPassword (Figure 4.4). To operationalisation the obstacle 
UseSocialEngeeringToLearnPassword, we convert it to Anti-requirement and assigned to 
anti-agent Malevolent (Figure 4.4).  
 
(d) Risk treatment  
Risk treatment is defined through the countermeasure chosen for handling the security 
obstacle, and its associated vulnerabilities, obstacle and anti-goals (Figure 4.4; Figure 4.5). 
In our example, the countermeasure chosen is Avoidance risk. 
 
(e) Security requirements definition  
To avoid the main obstacle UseSocialEngeeringToLearnPassword, new anti-obstacle goals 
are emerging from this countermeasure. A new goal model is thus built, with additional 
security goal(s), requirement(s). Resolution obstacles by Introduce a new goal Avoid 
[AccessToSystemByUnauthorised] as a countermeasure, this goal refined to into one 
requirement PerformAwarenessTraining (Figure 4.5). This requirement is assigned to the 
Security officer agent. 
 
(f) Control selection and implementation 
The update of the goal model, which might include the refinement and the 
operationalisation of the new added avoid goals, constitutes the new system-to-be, as in 
(Figure 4.5). 
 
This subsection outlines the elaboration of security requirements for the @RemoteSurgery 
system with KAOS.  
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Elaborating Security Requirements with KAOS, We will elaborate security 
requirements that are typical in the security domain; CIA. All security goals are expressed 
in terms of the sta eholder’s language. This reflects the fact that these are high level goals 
and are applicable to any alternative design chosen for the system. 
 
Goal Maintain[Security] 
  InformalDef  The system is secure 
  Category SecurityGoal 
 
Goal Maintain[Integrity] 
  InformalDef  information is guarded against unauthorised update  
  Category SecurityGoal 
  Refines  Security 
 
Goal Maintain[Confidentiality] 
  InformalDef  information is guarded against unauthorised disclosure  
  Category SecurityGoal 
  Refines  Security 
 
Goal Maintain[Availability] 
  InformalDef  information is guarded against disruption of service 
  Category SecurityGoal 
  Refines  Security 
 
Name PerformAwarenessTraining 
     InformalDef Start awareness training for doctors 
               Pattern   Achieve 
      Category Security 
      FormalDef  
 
Figure 4. 3 Asset and security objective modelling in KAOS. 
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Figure 4. 4 Security Obstacle Threat Risk analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4. 5 Security requirements and control modelling in KAOS. 
 
4.2.2 Alignment between KAOS and ISSRM domain model. 
 
It was not flexible to build a model for anti-requirements or anti-goal using obstacles. We 
should have converted these obstacles into operationalize model by using the requirements 
element and pairing them with agents and finally adding operation elements. 
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Concepts related to ISSRM asset are represented by KAOS goal, requirement and 
expectations. Operation and object are used to present asset while security criteria are 
represented by goal and object attributes. Threat agent is presented by anti-agent while 
action method is represented by operationalization, domain and required conditions and 
operation. Vulnerability is defined by the domain property. At a higher abstraction level, 
anti-goal represents event while it represents threat in lower levels (in combination with 
anti-requirements and anti-expectation). Security requirement is represented by security 
goal. This goal can be refined further by security requirement and expectation [Mayer, 
2009]. 
 
Discussion about the name of the concepts included in the ISSRM model 
 
Details on harmonisation between the concepts of KAOS and the domain model ISSRM 
(see Table 4.3) can be found in [Mayer, 2009] on three levels: Asset-related concepts, Risk-
related concepts, Risk treatment-related concepts in details. 
 




KAOS extended to security 



















































Risk / / / 
Impact / / / 












Domain property DoctorsAreNotSecurityAware 






of the attacker 
Operationaisation 












































SaS; Safety software; Cyber-Security; cyber-physical; Cyber-physical system; Mobile cyber physical systems; 




Knowledge Acquisition for Automated Specification; KAOS; Obstacle safety; safety software; Reliability; dependability security; dependability safety ; 
resilience; resilience engineering; MBD; STPA; STPA-sec; STAMP;RE; Goal; SaS dependability Criteria 
4.3 KAOS for Safety 
 
This section addresses KAOS for safety as well as artefact Safety Obstacles (Hazard). 
In software engineering, requirements specifications are documents that describe what a 
system has to perform in order for the stakeholders needs from a new software system to be 
met. 
For safety requirements, it is very important to deal with Obstacles (hazard) KAOS 
element, which capture undesired properties. It allows analysts to identify and address 
exceptional circumstances during requirements engineering in order to produce robust or 
new requirements to avoid or reduce the impact of obstacles giving more reliable software 
[Lamsweerde and Letier, 2000]. 
The more specific the goal is, the more specific its obstructing obstacles will be. As 
mentioned earlier, a high-level goal produces high-level obstacles that will be refined into 
much smaller sub-obstacles. These sub-obstacles are used for precise obstacle identification 
in order to evaluate their feasibility through agent behaviour negative scenarios. It is much 
easier and preferable to refine what is wanted than what is not wanted. 
The level of how extensive obstacle identification is depends on the type and priority of the 
obstructed goal. For example, obstacle identification in Safety Goals needs to be adequately 
extensive. Domain-specific cost-benefit analysis needs to be performed to decide when the 
obstacle identification process should terminate. 
Obstacle OR-refinement yields sufficient sub-obstacles to establish the obstacle; each OR-
refinement of an obstacle obstructs the goal obstructed by this obstacle, goals and AND/OR 
refinement of obstacles proceed exactly the same way except for only a few alternative OR 
refinements are generally considered, in the case of obstacles, one may identify as many 
alternative obstacles as possible. 
 
4.3.1 Running example - Safety Side 
 
The example @RemoteSurgery that was mentioned previously in section 1.2 and ISSRM 
Risk management process introduced in section 3.2 containing six steps, which will be 
implemented on the example using KAOS legend goal modelling language (Figure 4.1). 
 
(a) Scope and asset identification 
This step is done through the definition of goals and their refinement in the KAOS safety 
goal model, as depicted in (Figure 4.6) the main goal studied in the example is Maintain 
[AccuracyMovementScale], which is refined in the context domain property 
SurgeonWellTrained and the sub-goals QualityOfImage associated to the agent Camara 
and MinimalLatency. More details about the IS are given in the operation model 
QualityOfImage. The goal QualityOfImage is associated to the agent Camara. It also 
performs other operations (BoundaryDetection and ImageAcuisitions). 
 
(b) Determination of quality factor objective 
Figure 4.6, the determination of safety objectives is done in the same model and generally 
in the same time as the elicitation of other goals. MinimalLatency and QualityOfImage are 
an example of safety objective; safety need, meaning that we need the accuracy, robustness 
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(c) Hazard analysis and assessment  
We elaborate safety hazards by negating the goal AccuracyMovementScale to obtain the 
root obstacle WrongMovementScale (Figure 4.6; Figure 4.7). We elaborate by hazard 
analysis to refined the main obstacle WrongMovementScale to two sub-obstacle 
UnwantedMovements and NotSmoothAndPreciseSurgicalManeuvers (Figure 4.7).  
 
(d) Hazard treatment  
Hazard treatment is defined through the countermeasure chosen for handling the safety 
obstacle, and its associated vulnerabilities, obstacles (Figure 4.7). In our example, the 
countermeasure chosen is prevent hazard; controlling and interacting with hazards so they 
do not become accidents. 
 
(e) Quality requirements definition 
Obstacles prevention by introduce a new goal Avoid WrongMovementScale as a 
countermeasures, this goal refined to into two requirement WantedMovements and 
SmoothAndPreciseSurgicalManeuvers. This requirements are assigned to the 
ComputerSoftware agent. It also performs operation FilterOutHandTremors. (Figure 4.8). 
 
(f) Constraint selection and implementation  
The update of the safety goal model, which might include the refinement and the 
operationalisation of the new added Achieve goals, constitutes the new system-to-be, as in 
(Figure 4.8). 
 
This subsection outlines the elaboration of safety requirements for the @RemoteSurgery 
system with KAOS.  
 
Elaborating Safety Requirements with KAOS, we will elaborate safety requirements that 
are typical in the safety domain. All safety goals are expressed in terms of the sta eholder’s 
language. This reflects the fact that these are high level goals and are applicable to any 
alternative design chosen for the system. 
 
Goal Maintain[Survivability] 
InformalDef  @RemoteSurgery to continue to deliver its services to users in the face of 
deliberate or accidental attack [Romani et al., 2009]. 
 Category SafetyGoal 
 
Goal Maintain[Accuracy] 
InformalDef  @RemoteSurgery Software attributes that demonstrate the generation of 
results or correct effects or according to what has been agreed upon 
[Romani et al., 2009]. 
 Category AccuracyGoal 
 Refines  Safety 
 
Goal Maintain[Robustness] 
InformalDef  @RemoteSurgery can function correctly in the presence of invalid inputs 
or stressful environmental conditions [Romani et al., 2009]. 
 Category RobustnessGoal 
 Refines  Safety 
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Figure 4. 7 Obstacle Safety Hazard Analysis. 
 
 
4.3.2 Alignment between KAOS safety and ISRM domain model 
 
In this section we will contribute towards Alignment between KAOS and ISRM and create 
relationship and mapping between the concepts of both KAOS and ISRM. 
 
Discussion about the name of the concepts included in the ISRM domain model 
 
After identifying the different terms used in each ISRM source, our assumption that the 
terminology in the ISRM model is not unified has been validated. Many different terms are 
used to depict the same concept. More than a dozen of different names have been found for 
some concepts in Table 4.4 (concept (5) and (9)). Sometimes, the same name is used to 
depict different concepts. For example, Harm is due to an accident when dealing with 
safety engineering, is due to an attack when dealing with security engineering. 
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The process of extraction and concepts identification (Table 4.4) based on chapter 2 section 
2.2 and the definitions used for each concept in the ISRM model. 
 
 
Figure 4. 8 Safety requirements and control modelling in KAOS. 
 
Table 4. 4 Names of the concepts included in the ISRM model. 
















6 Safety vulnerability 
Risk treatment -
related concepts 
7 Safety Goal 
8 Safety requirement 




After identifying the concepts comes the aligning process (Table 4.5), and define 
relationships between concepts of each model. 
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KAOS is mainly focused on the security of the system-to-be, but it does not make a 
separation between the IS and business aspects. Thus, we align the Asset ISRM concepts 
concerning assets with the KAOS strategical goal, requirement and expectation (Table 
4.5). Moreover, their operationalisation in operation and object are also assets. In KAOS, 
states of the system-to-be are described using object attributes. The purpose of the Safety 
goals is to achieving a target level of safety or one of its subfactors (Table 2.2; Section 
2.2). In terms of KAOS, this means that the safety goals should define quality subfactor 
(Table 2.2; Section 2.2), and object attributes, which are concerned by potential risk events 
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and hazard [Lamsweerde, 2004]. Thus, we align both (safety) goals and object attributes 
concerned by goal with ISRM quality subfactor. 
 
Risk-related concepts 
In Table 4.5, we align together ISRM danger, hazard and threat with KAOS Negative 
scenarios, anti-goal (also called malicious obstacle). Anti-goals can be identified at various 
abstraction levels, so they might need to be refined until they become anti-requirements or 
anti-expectations (assigned to an anti-agent). At higher abstraction levels, an anti-goal 
might be considered as the event, which, according to the ISRM model, is a combination of 
a hazard and one or more vulnerabilities (safety). At lower abstraction levels, an anti-goal 
(anti-requirement or anti-expectation) is a hazard, which is a potential attack or incident to 
assets. The language concepts for anti-goal, anti-requirement and anti-expectation remains 
respectively goal, requirement and expectation. 
 
In Table 4.5, we align ISRM safety vulnerability and the KAOS domain property. The 
KAOS domain property is a hypothesis about the domain that holds independently of the 
system-to-be. In correspondence, ISRM vulnerability (safety) is defined as attributes of 
assets. Following the ISRM model, Hazard (Danger) cause harm to the assets, due to an 
accident when dealing with safety engineering, is due to an attack when dealing with 
security engineering. 
ISRM domain model does not address hazard agent or hazard method. This explains why in 
this model, there is no description for agent and operationalization.  
 
Risk treatment-related concepts 
ISRM risk treatment corresponds to the countermeasures [Lamsweerde, 2004; Lamsweerde 
and Letier, 2000] that are elaborated after identification of the anti-goals. Countermeasures 
are not KAOS modelling concepts, but rather modelling idioms or patterns adopted by 
modellers. In KAOS, the countermeasures usually result in new sefaty goals, which need to 
be further refined into realisable safety requirements and expectations.  
 
In Table 4.5, we align ISRM safety requirement and the KAOS Safety goal (requirements 
and expectations). The refinement and operationalisation of the new safety goals, their 
concerned objects and attributes, and their assignment to agents (a.k.a software; people; 
sub-system), lead to new system-to-be components realising the necessary safety means. 
With respect to the ISRM model, these new system components correspond to Safety 
mechanism, Safeguard and Safety tactic [Firesmith, 2003]. 
4.4 Summary 
We addressed KAOS in the representation of risk management process resulting from the 
ISSRM domain model in order to represent the security engineering side on the example 
@RunningSurgery. We also worked on the alignments between KAOS and ISSRM domain 
model and addressing the elements of ISSRM that have been covered in KAOS. 
 
Furthermore, we addressed KAOS in the representation of hazard management process 
resulting from the ISRM model in order to represent the safety engineering side on the 
example @RunningSurgery. We also worked on the alignments between KAOS and ISRM 
domain model and addressing the elements of ISRM that have been covered in KAOS. 
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CHAPTER 5 Common Method to Define 
Security and Safety (SaS) 
 




We will address the standards and the SaS domain produced followed by hazard/risk 
management process and SaS modelling languages. This chapter also includes an 
introduction on STAMP approach which is expanded upon in the appendices A, B, and C. 
5.1 Software Safety and Security Engineering Approach and Standards 
 
New standards were created to deal with software-intensive systems [ISO 14971, 2012], 
cyber-physical systems [IEC 62645, 2011], and shared-control systems [FDA, 2013]. These 
modern standards define the nature of maintaining (considering its legacy software 
systems, and connecting these systems to the network is highly risky because they lose the 
security engineering resistance), or building these systems from scratch to match the 
requirements of safety and security engineering. Not only that, new laws such as 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012 [CSA2012] appeared. This bill addresses the threats and 
weaknesses in critical systems that are connected to the network and trying to take over 
them. 
 
High-Assurance Cyber Military Systems (HACMS) Clean-Slate Approach was 
introduced based on the highest quality results for critical systems regarding the safety and 
security engineering specifications DARPA-BAA-12-21 [DARPA, 2012], through the use 
of a rigid language for mathematical representation or a semi-automated code synthesis 
from executable to get formal functions, which are machine-checkable proofed leading to 
having code that meets with functional specification as well as security and safety 
specifications. (Figure 5.1) where blue squares represent formal specification, the most 
important synthesizer component. For a domain-specific, the synthesizer takes the safety 
and security policies of an element, a functional specification, a description of the target 
hardware, resource constraints, and the description of the specific environment for the 




















Figure 5. 1 HACMS Clean-Slate Approach, (Adapted from [DARPA, 2012]). 
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ISO 14971 standard addresses manufacturing medical devices and developing the software 
for them [ISO 14971, 2012] and aims to integrating the process of risk management and an 
early stage of design, to produce evidence that their risk assessment process [ISO 14971, 
2012] considered and addressed both intentional and unintentional security risks to the 
medical device with appropriate security controls as part of the device’s design  Medical 
device manufacturers should consider the malicious activity during the early phases of the 
requirements engineering. 
 
A draft guidance [FDA, 2013] titled "Management of cybersecurity in medical and 
Hospital Network". The draft discusses the security risks that face medical devices and 
carry rules to implement safeguards in order to reduce and avoid risk of device failure due 
to a malicious attack. 
 
5.2 SaS Domain Model  
 
SaS is a requirement driven software engineering approach is a result of adapting the 
domain ISRM in chapter 2, which is also a risk analysis approach that inherited the same 
method from the ISSRM domain model in chapter 3, that deals with security and safety 
requirements.  
 
SaS needs a requirements elaboration method and a design elaboration method in order to 
cover all the stages of development until implementation is obtained. SaS employs the 
KAOS for eliciting, modeling and analyzing security requirements and safety requirements 
while it employs the semi-formal specification language and LTL formal specification 
language for deriving requirements specifications for both safety and security. 
 
The idea behind integrating chapter 3 ISSRM and ISRM domain model in chapter 2 is the 
main objective that is achieving a certain degree of dependability in the system-to-be. The 
thrive for achieving dependability in a system-to-be is because the principle of 
dependability deals with both intentional and unintentional incidents. 
 
This model is the result of merging the ISSRM domain that focuses on security and the 
ISRM domain that focuses on safety producing a SaS domain model (Figure 5.2). Both 
these domains have been addressed previously. 
 
Discussion of the safety and security model SaS (Figure 5.2): 
 
1. Assets "anything that has value to the organisation and is necessary for achieving 
its objectives". These assets differ from a company to another whether it’s (a   a  
software, IT infrastructure, users, or strategic plan, etc.). 
2. Control in ISRM [Firesmith, 2003] and ISSRM models [Mayer, 2009], we find that 
both models agree that there is control that is responsible for meeting the safety and 
security requirements and minimising the number of vulnerabilities by 
implementing safeguard and fail-safe methods. 
3. SaS Hazard concept is often used when dealing with systems that if an error 
occurred, the environment in which the system exists would be affected. The 
researchers [Chapon et al, 2011] have derived concept for it to describe both 
safety(ISRM) and security(ISSRM). 
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Figure 5. 2 SaS domain model. 
 
4. Event is the combination of a threat(ISSRM)/hazard(ISRM) and one or more 
intentional/ unintentional vulnerabilities. Intentional is feature of security 
engineering. There is always a motive and the intention behind planning an attack 
against the CIA concepts. Unintentional is feature of safety engineering. We do not 
know what accidents we will be facing and so, safety engineering follows very strict 
mathematical, qualitative, and quantitative methods to accurately analyse risks in 
order to limit the occurrence of any hazard and the control them. 
5. Harm is a significant damage, usually associated with an asset that is caused by a 
hazard, it come from the combination of identified severities and identified 
likelihoods. 
6. Impact the latent negative consequence of a hazard, where it negates dependability 
requirement criteria (Table 5.1). 
7. Dependability requirements is the umbrella under which come many attributes 
including those of safety and security. These attributes are chosen based on the 
nature of the system to be developed and only one either for safety or security might 
be chosen, or both, according to what the researchers [Avizienis et al., 2004] have 
addressed in details the concepts and definitions of dependable.  
Dependability requirement should to be resilience to Intentional threats and 
Unintentional hazards. 
8. Hazard Treatment is the kinds of quality requirements of dependability 
requirement after choosing with the attributes associated quality characteristics and 
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quality measures. Standards must be defined according to the system to be 
developed. From a security perspective, these standards should be CIA standards, or 
in some cases non-repudiation ones. On the other hand, survivability, quality of 
service, fault tolerance, correctness, reliability, verification, validation, and 
maintainability from the safety perspective. It is important to mention that, 
depending on chosen dependability requirement, the dependability attributes (Table 
5.1), and (Table 5.2) show a sub-criterion of performance attribute. The researcher 
Firesmith has listed the concepts of security, safety, and survivability under a more 
general concept, defensibility [Firesmith, 2003], which is a special case of 
dependability. 
Table 5. 1 Dependability Attributes of SaS, (Adapted from [Firesmith, 2012; Romani et al., 2009]). 
Concepts Criterion SaS 
Safety Security 
Fail-safe Confidentiality 









9. Dependability policy are responsible for preventing chosen attributes requirements 
conflict as it determines the priority for each one.  
10. Dependability goal the operational level of the system is determined to work in the 
environment it was built for depending on whether this system will be used by 
everyone, professionals in a certain field, or a team that was well-trained. This is 
due to the fact that the product has a very high level of risk in case of human errors. 
After responsible authorities test the system, in this case it is Civil/Federal Aviation 
Authority [FAA, 2007; 1998], the final product of the system will be granted 
Airworthiness Certificate. 
Examples of Dependability goals might  e  “The @RemoteSurgery must  e safe” or 
“@RemoteSurgery must  e secure”  
 
Table 5. 2 Sub-criterion of performance, (from [Firesmith, 2003b]). 
Sub-criterion Definition 
 Jitter " is the precision (i.e., variability) of the time when one or 
more events occur." 
 Latency " is the time it takes to actually provide a requested service 
or allow access to a resource." 
 Response time " time is the degree to which the time it takes to initially 
respond to a request for a service or to access a resource." 
 Scheduleability " is the degree to which events and behaviors can be 
scheduled. " 
 Throughput " is the number of times that a service is provided within a 
specified unit of time." 
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After identifying the different terms used in each SaS source, our assumption that the 
concepts  in the SaS model is not unified has been validated. Many different terms are used 
to depict the same concept. More than a dozen of different names have been found for some 
concepts in Table 5.3. 
 
The process of extraction and concepts alignment (Table 5.3) based on (chapter 2 section 
2.2, chapter 3 section 3.1 and chapter 5 section 5.2 ) and the definitions used for each 
concept in the SaS model. 
 
Table 5. 3 Concepts alignment between ISSRM,  ISRM and SaS models. 



































































































5.3 SaS Risk Management Process 
 
A lot of effort was invested in developing a common cross-industry approach to managing 
risk such as ICH Q9 [ICH, 2005] an recently, ISO 14971 [ISO 14971, 2012], which defines 
the analysis requirements for medical devices that have the ability to connect to the 
network from the start of the production process for these devices.  
We elicited these six steps [ISO 14971, 2012;  ICH, 2005] process (Figure 5.3) for SaS risk 
management from the safety perspective through adapted ISRM model; chapter 2 
[Firesmith, 2003] and security  perspective through ISSRM domain model; chapter 3 
[Mayer, 2009]. The following Steps are (a to f) Summarised are follows. 
 
 (a) Scope and context asset identification the process of searching for stakeholders to 
address the safety and security implications, at the system level and their environments 
(a.k.a. assets, physical, social) for the purpose of defining the scope. After that, the assets of 
value for the company as well as the assets related to safety and security engineering need 
to be identified. The output of this step is the definition of the scope and its relation to the 
system and the environment and a priority list and rankings of assets to be secured from a 
safety and security perspective starting with the assets of the highest priority. 
SaS; Safety software; Cyber-Security; cyber-physical; Cyber-physical system; Mobile cyber physical systems; 




Knowledge Acquisition for Automated Specification; KAOS; Obstacle safety; safety software; Reliability; dependability security; dependability safety ; 
resilience; resilience engineering; MBD; STPA; STPA-sec; STAMP;RE; Goal; SaS dependability Criteria 
 
 (b) Determination of dependability objectives in this step, we set a dependability need 
for every asset identified in the previous step, while each asset has its own characteristics, 
which requires the identification of Safety/Security goals for each of these assets as 
summarized in (Table 5.1).  The existing attributes in Table 5.1 give a general idea on the 
attributes of critical systems. However, its not necessary that each system contain each 
attribute keeping in mind that the more attributes there are in a system, the more it would 
cost. What is Table 5.1; 5.2 is for illustration purposes only. The full set of attributes are 
available at [Firesmith, 2004; Avizienis et al., 2004]. 
 
(c) Risk analysis and assessment the third step consists of the identification of existing 
and potential hazards that are likely to violate the safety/security goals resulting in 
accidents. Without doubt, these accidents will cause damage to assets and environment.  
Using hazard analysis methodologies such as HAZOP, FTA, AT, FMEA for instance, and 
using the Scenario, AF, KAOS and misuse-cases from a security perspective. After 
identification, these hazards are evaluated and the degree of risk is measured using 
quantitative and qualitative analysis. At this stage, the defining the likelihood of 
occurrence, defining consequence categories, and risk matrix are produced and the result is 
full information on these hazards. After that, ALARP principle is implemented to measure 
the tolerance of each hazard [Redmill, 1999]. If the results are dissatisfying, the entire 
process has to be performed again starting from step (a), otherwise, the process proceeds to 
step (d). 
 
(d) Risk treatment in this step the decision is made regarding these hazards. These types 
of risk treatments are divided to three categories: prevention, reducing, or retaining risk. 
 
(e) Dependability requirements definition depending on the decision(s) made and 
choosing the measures in the previous step, we derive the Control, and the strategic 
decision that will satisfy dependability requirement to define SIL target that complies to 
what has been chosen in order to mitigate and control harms resulting from hazards. 
 
(f) Constraint selection and implementation in this step, the decisions made regarding 
hazards are implemented by setting constraints that comply to SIL target in parallel with 
implementing safeguards for intentional and unintentional hazards. To ensure the 
compatibility of the chosen dependability criterion for each asset individually by referring 
to the dependability policy. 
 
Safety-critical and security-critical software systems are dynamic and interactive resulting 
in having unintentional hazards. The upgrading process is continuous as the main objective 
of monitor the residual risk and its compliance to the standards and certificate [Axelrod, 
2012; Brazendale, 1995]. 
5.4 SaS Techniques Modelling  
 
Techniques languages such as Swiss cheese model [Pemeger, 2005] and AcciMap [Salmon 
et al., 2012] classified as systems-based accident analysis methods. The approaches of these 
techniques are not domain-specific in accident analysis for a particular industry and what 
makes these approaches stand out is that the socio-technical aspect is taken into account 
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during the analysis. Furthermore, these approaches are used in different industries such as 
aviation, defence, food, public health, oil and gas, and rail transport. 
 
Swiss cheese model, developed by Reason [Reason, 1990], is a well-known even-chain 
model that uses the swiss cheese metaphor making use of slices in the cheese itself, which 
represent barriers in a system that intend to prevent errors that could lead to unfavourable 
events from occurring, and the holes in each slice that suggest multiple contributors. 
However the swiss cheese model is not without drawbacks and is not accepted uncritically 
[Preneger, 2005]. The swiss cheese model [Reason, 1990] describes both the interaction 
between system wide latent conditions and unsafe acts made by human operators and their 
roles in accidents, and the role of defences and engineering safety features designed to 
prevent accidents.  
 
AcciMap  an analysis technique  ased on Ramsussen’s ris  management framewor  
[Rasmussen, 1997], is a generic approach that does not use taxonomies of failures across 
the different levels considered and designed specifically for analysing the cause of acidents 
and incidents that occur in complex socio-technical systems [Rasmussen, 1997; Rasmussen 
and Svedung, 2000]. AcciMap involves the construction of a multi-layered causal diagram 
in which the various causes of an accident are arranged according to their causal 
remoteness from the outcome. The lower levels typically represent the immediate 
precursors to the event, relating to the activities of workers and to physical events, 
processes and conditions that contributed to the outcome. The highest levels generally 
incorporate governmental or societal-level causal factors, which are external to the 
organisation(s) involved in the event [Salmon et al., 2012]. This way, the full range of 
factors that contributed to the event is modelled. 
 
 
Figure 5. 3 SaS Risk Management Process, (Adapted from [ISO 14971, 2012; ICH, 2005]). 
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5.5 STAMP Approach 
 
STAMP was developed by Nancy G. Leveson [Leveson, 2004], and is similar in theory 
with traditional hazard analysis methods (Figure 5.4  (for example  Rasmussen’s ris  
management framework and AcciMap). However, Nancy [Leveson, 2005] considers these 
traditional hazard analysis methods only to deal with monitoring the accident flow and how 
it occurred. The traditional methods cannot explain how the accident happened in a 
component-nested system and taking the socio-technical aspects into consideration, which 
in turn interacts with this system [Leveson, 2012]. It is considered as a cognitive hazard 
analysis method because it integrates all aspects of risk, including organizational and social 
aspects to understand accident causation.  
She then published various publications extending the former, focussed on safety [Leveson, 
2012; Leveson, 2005]. These publications are finally reinforced by some recent tutorials 
[Leveson, 2014; 2013; 2012], presenting his work in-depth about safety engineering, which 
are part of resilience engineering [Hollnagel et al., 2006].  
 
STAMP [Leveson, 2004] is the most recent approach to be developed (Figure 5.4), and 
considered a new accident causality model based on systems theory [Leveson, 2012]. 
STAMP approach deals with safety through a technical language called STPA that interacts 
with identifying hazards and hazard analysis [Pereira, et al., 2006], it can be used early in 
the system development life cycle to elicitation high level safety requirements and 
constraints in terms of identifying more causal factors and hazardous scenarios [Leveson, 
2012].  
 
Young [Young and Leveson, 2014; 2013] has developed an extension of STPA to serve the 
hazard analysis for security engineering (Young used term cyber-security) and known as 
STPA-Sec. Young published some recent tutorials [Young, 2014] presenting his work in-
depth about security (cyber-security). 
 
Some tools that automate the activities of STPA were developed that support the hazard 






Figure 5. 4 Accident Analysis and Risk Assessment Methods, (From [Eurocontrol, 2009]). 
                                                     
1 http://www.iste.uni-stuttgart.de/en/se/werkzeuge/a-stpa.html, accessed April 27, 2014. 
2 http://www.safeware-eng.com/software%20safety%20products/features.htm, accessed April 27, 2014. 
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STAMP approach is explained in details (Appendix A) using SaS information domain 
model elements as well as the details of running the example “@RemoteSurgery” using 
STPA; for safety side, and STPA-sec; for security side STAMP languages techniques can 
be found in (Appendices B, and C). The results of this process  are discussed in chapter 7. 
 
We will use KAOS language in chapter 6 to represent and run the example 
@RemoteSurgery in the SaS side. The results of this process  are discussed in chapter 7. 
 
5.6 Summary 
We proposed a conceptual domain model through the creation of a (SaS) domain model 
that integrates safety and security domains giving a better opportunity for interplay and 
integration to find a middle ground between the two domains as well as unifying definitions 
through their mappings onto the common concepts. We addressed the standards and the 
SaS domain produced followed by hazard/risk management process and SaS modelling 
languages, also includes an introduction on STAMP approach. And the SaS domain and 
hazard management process will be used in running the example @RemoteSurgery using 
KAOS modelling languages from the safety and security sides. 
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CHAPTER 6 Knowledge Acquisition in 
autOmated Specification For SaS 
 
6.1 KAOS for SaS 
This section addresses KAOS for safety and security as well as artefact SaS Obstacles 
(Hazard and Threat). Here, we will gather all what has been addressed in sections 4.2 
(KAOS for Security) and sections 4.3 (KAOS for Safety). 
 
For safety-critical requirements analysis, it is crucial to deal with obstacles KAOS element. 
The Obstacles element is a common element between safety and security (Table 6.1). 
 
Obstacles KAOS element are not only limited to representing safety goals but also depends 
mainly on the system-to-be, its specifications and specific environment (Table 6.1). It is 
possible to deal with inaccuracy obstacles or non-satisfaction obstacles [Lamsweerde and 
Letier, 2000]. Knowing the classification domain; first step from SaS Risk Management 
Process - (a) Scope and context asset identification, of obstacles enables and enhances 
finding suitable treatments. 
 
 
Table 6. 1 Obstacle Categories, (Adapted from [Lamsweerde, 2009]). 
Types of Obstacle To Represent 
Hazard Obstacle Goal Safety 
Threat Obstacle Security Goal 
Dissatisfaction Obstacle Satisfaction Goal 
Misinformation Obstacle Information Safety 
Inaccuracy Obstacle Accuracy Goal 
Unusability Obstacle Usability Goal 
 
Dependability in the goal CorrectnessMovementScale on safety and security overlaps. 
From a safety perspective, this is due to the hazards that could threaten (hazardous) the 
communications link between the master console that transmits movements for the 
operation and the slave console that controls robotic arms that operate on the patient by 
receiving commands from the performing surgeon as well as the software used to control 
accuracy and measurement. These threats vary between getting these consoles infected by 
viruses and malware [Deloitte, 2013], which will drastically affect the performance of these 
devices especially the connection link because if there was a cyber-attack [FDA, 2013] on 
the service provider for the hospital to perform the operation remotely is a serious problem. 
This is because there is zero tolerance when it comes to packets loss or high latency, which 
could have serious consequences in transmitting images to the operating surgeon and 
latency in commands receipt on the slave console side for the robotic arms performing the 
surgery resulting in a possibility of harming the patient. Researchers in this field concluded 
this as well [Marescaux, et. al., 2002], [Anvari et al., 2005; Anvari, 2007] and [Jumpei et 
al., 2006]. On the other hand, from a safety perspective, the robotic arms and the camera 
should not stop working all of a sudden without warning. 
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6.2 Running example - SaS Side  
 
The example @RemoteSurgery that was mentioned in Sections 1.4 and 1.5  through SaS 
risk management process introduced in section 5.3 containing six steps and implement 
them on the example using KAOS legend goal modelling language (Figure 4.1). 
 
(a) Scope and context asset identification  
This step is done through the definition of goals and their refinement in the KAOS safety 
and security  goal model, as depicted in (Figure 6.1) The main goal studied in the example 
is Maintain [CorrectnessMovementScale] for both Safety and Security modelling analysis, 
which is refined in the context domain property SurgeonWellTrained and the sub-goals 
from safety side QualityOfImage associated to the agent Camara and sub-goals from 
security side MinimalLatency associated to the agent ServiceProvider.  
More details about the IS are given in the Safety operation model QualityOfImage. The goal 
QualityOfImage is associated to the agent Camara. It also performs other operations 
(BoundaryDetection and ImageAcuisitions).And More details about the IS are given in the 
Security operation model MinimalLatency. The goal MinimalLatency is associated to the 
agent ServiceProvider. He also performs other operations (offer High-Bandwidth 
communication) (Figure 6.1). 
 
(b) Determination of dependability objectives  
Figure 6.1, the determination of SaS objectives is done in the same model and generally in 
the same time as the elicitation of other goals. MinimalLatency and QualityOfImage are an 
example of SaS objective; SaS need, meaning that we need the accuracy, correctness, 
robustness, integrity and availability of MovementScale; SurgicalManeuvers; 
MinimalLatency; InsertionOfMaliciousSoftware; Redundancy Components. 
 
(c) Risk analysis and assessment 
We elaborate safety and security requirements by negating the SaS goal 
CorrectnessMovementScale (for Security and Safety goals) to obtain the root Obstacles 
NoAvailability (Figure 6.1; Figure 2.6). We elaborate by hazard analysis to refined the main 
Obstacle NoAvailability to three sub-obstacle; DriverUnresponsive; 
CommuicationUnderDDOSAttack; HardwareUnresponsive (Figure 6.2).  
 
(d) Risk treatment  
Hazard treatment is defined through the countermeasure chosen for handling the Safety and 
Security Obstacle, and its associated vulnerabilities, obstacles (Figure 6.2). In our example, 
the countermeasure chosen is prevent hazards; controlling and interacting with hazards so 
they do not become accidents. 
 
(e) Dependability requirements definition  
Obstacles prevention by introduce a new goals Avoid [HighLatency]; 
Achieve[RedundancyComponents];Avoid[FailedSoftware];Avoid[InsertionOfMaliciousSoft
ware] as a countermeasures.  HighLatency and RedundancyComponents goals refined to 
into two requirements RedundancyCommuicationLine and Minimal_Latency, both 
requirements are assigned to the ServiceProvider agent. FailedSoftware and 
InsertionOfMaliciousSoftware goals refined to into two requirements Driverresponsive and 
WatchdogCheck, both requirements are assigned to the ComputerSoftware agent (Figure 
6.3). 
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(f) Constraint selection and implementation  
The update of the safety goal model, which might include the refinement and the 
operationalisation of the new added Avoid and achieve goals to meet our expectations, 
constitutes the new system-to-be, as in (Figure 6.3). We outlines the elaboration of Safety 
and Security requirements for the @RemoteSurgery system with KAOS. 
 
Elaborating SaS Requirements with KAOS we will elaborate safety requirements that 
are typical in the safety domain. Security and safety goals are expressed in terms of the 
sta eholder’s language. This reflects the fact that these are high level goals and are 




InformalDef  The ability of @RemoteSurgery "computer-communication, system-base 
application to continue satisfying certain critical requirements( e.g., 
requirement for security, safety, accuracy and correctness, …)in the face of 
adverse conditions" [Rus et al., 2003; Romani et al., 2009] 
 Category Safety&SecurityGoal 
 
 





InformalDef  The ability of @RemoteSurgery "to be in a state to perform a required 
function under given conditions at given instant of time or over a given 
time interval , assuming that the required external resource are provided 
"[ESA, 2004 ; Romani et al., 2009] 
Category AvailabilityGoal 




InformalDef  @RemoteSurgery "Software attributes that demonstrate the generation of 
results or correct effects or according to what has been agreed upon 
"[Romani et al., 2009]. 
 Category AccuracyGoal 




InformalDef  @RemoteSurgery "the degree to which a work product and its output are 
free from defects once the work product is delivered" [Firesmith, 2009]. 
 Category CorrectnessGoal 
 Refines  Safety&SecurityGoal 
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Figure 6. 2 Safety and Security Obstacle Hazard analysis. 
 
6.3 Alignment between KAOS and SaS domain model. 
 
In this section we will contribute towards Alignment between KAOS and SaS and create 
relationship and mapping between the concepts of both KAOS and SaS. 
 
Discussion about the name of the concepts included in the SaS model 
 
After identifying the different terms used in each SaS source, our assumption that the 
terminology in the SaS model is not unified has been validated. Many different terms are 
used to depict the same concept. More than a dozen of different names have been found for 
some concepts in (Table 5.3). 
 
After identifying the concepts comes the aligning process (Table 6.2), and define 
relationships between KAOS and SaS. 
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Figure 6. 3 Safety and Security requirements and control modelling in KAOS. 
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6.3.1 Discussion about the alignment tables 
 
Asset-related concepts 
KAOS is mainly focused on the security of the system-to-be, but it does not make a 
separation between the IS and business aspects. Thus, we align the Asset SaS concepts 
concerning assets with the KAOS Strategical goal, requirement and expectation (Table 
6.2). Moreover, their operationalisation in operation and object are also assets. In KAOS, 
states of the system-to-be are described using object attributes. The purpose of the Safety 
goals is to achieving a target level of safety or one of its subfactors. In terms of KAOS, this 
means that the safety and security goals should define SaS criterion (Table 5.1), which are 
concerned by potential risk events and hazard and/or threat (Table 6.1)  [Lamsweerde, 
2004]. Thus, we align both (safety) goals concerned by Expectation; anti-requirements; 
anti-goals with SaS requirement criteria. 
 
Risk-related concepts 
In Table 6.2, we align together SaS (unintentional and intentional) hazard (Table 6.1) with 
KAOS Obstacle, Negative scenarios (also called hazard obstacle; threat obstacle; 
dissatisfaction obstacle; misinformation obstacle; inaccuracy obstacle; unusability 
obstacle). Obstacle can be identified at various abstraction levels, so they might need to be 
refined until they become anti-requirements or anti-expectations (assigned to an anti-
agent). At higher abstraction levels, an anti-model might be considered as the event, which, 
according to the SaS model, is a combination of a hazard and one or more vulnerabilities 
(safety or security or both or see Table 6.1). At lower abstraction levels, an anti-model 
(anti-requirement or anti-expectation) is a hazard, which is an unintentional attack or 
intentional to assets. The language concepts for anti-model, anti-requirement and anti-
expectation remains respectively goal, requirement and expectation. 
 
In Table 6.2, we align SaS Vulnerability and the KAOS domain property. The KAOS 
domain property is a hypothesis about the domain that holds independently of the system-
to-be. In correspondence, SaS vulnerability is defined as attributes of assets. Following the 
SaS model, Hazards (Table 6.1) cause harm to the assets, due to an unintentional accident 
when dealing with safety engineering, is due to an intentional attack when dealing with 
security engineering. 
In KAOS, an anti-agent monitors or controls objects and their attributes, and is thereby 
capable to hazardous the system-to-be. In (Table 6.2), we align SaS unintentional and 
intentional and KAOS malicious agent; non-malicious; anti-agent. The SaS model is not 
clear is there attack method characterises the means by which intentional or/and 
unintentional attacker carries out the attack. In KAOS an anti-agent performs operations 
that satisfy an anti-model. Operations change the state of the system-to-be using 
input/output relationships over the objects and their attributes. This means that by 
performing operations, the anti-agent (malicious agent; non-malicious) breaks the safety 
and security criteria (Table 5.1) (related to object attributes). (Table 6.2), we align SaS 
unintentional and intentional with the KAOS constructs used to operationalise the anti-
model, namely operationalisation, domain and required conditions and operation. 
 
 
Risk treatment-related concepts 
SaS hazard treatment corresponds to the countermeasures [Lamsweerde, 2004; 
Lamsweerde and Letier, 2000] that are elaborated after identification of the anti-model. 
Countermeasures are not KAOS modelling concepts, but rather modelling idioms or 
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patterns adopted by modellers. In KAOS, the countermeasures usually result in new 
dependability goals, which need to be further refined into realisable safety and security 
requirements and expectations. In (Table 6.2), we align SaS security requirements; safety 
requirement and the KAOS Safety goal; security goals (requirements and expectations). 
The refinement and operationalisation of the new safety and security goals, their concerned 
objects and attributes, and their assignment to agents, lead to new system-to-be 
components realising the necessary safety and security means. With respect to the ISSRM 
[Mayer, 2009] and ISRM [Firesmith, 2003] information models, these new system 
components correspond to Control. 
 
Table 6. 2 Concept alignment between KAOS extended to SaS. 
 
SaS Model 
KAOS extended to SaS 
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We worked on integrating safety engineering and security engineering through the use of 
KAOS techniques language, which was used to represent accident management process 
resulting from the SaS domain model in order to represent both the safety and the security 
sides in the example @RunningSurgery. Furthermore, we worked on the alignment 
between KAOS and SaS domain model and addressing the SaS elements that have been 
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CHAPTER 7 Validation 




In this chapter, we address the results achieved from this research. Goal, Question, Metric 
approach (GQM) [Basili et al., 1994] will be used in questioning the metrics used for 
validation. 
 
The level of maturity of the SaS domain model. In other words, we want to count the 
concepts this domain model inherited from both the ISSRM [Mayer, 2009] and the ISRM  
[Firesmith, 2003] domains to serve the application of the dependability concept. The metric 
here is concept completeness. 
  
The second goal is divided into two parts; since SaS domain model has inherited several 
concepts from the ISSRM and the ISRM domain models that overlap, which affected the 
result of the alignment process between SaS concepts and KAOS patterns elements. This is 
because KAOS does not support constructing redundant elements  Matulevičius and 
Heymans, 2007]. The metric here is semantic completeness. The second part of this goal is 
whether the alignment process between KAOS verbs concepts and SaS concepts is 
semantic correctness.  
 
7.1 Case study 
 
To sum it up, a SaS information model has been created (chapter 5) and used one of the 
Goal modeling language (GML) languages, namely KAOS modelling language (chapter 6) 
to implement the hazard management process for SaS on the example @RunningSurgery, 
and the alignment process between the KAOS and the SaS domains (chapter 6). 
 
Furthermore, we used STAMP and its STPA-sec modelling language, which are 
categorised under scenario-based approach. We first align SaS and STAMP using the 
example @RunningSugery using a scenario-based approach, then we applied hazard 
management process from the safety side using STPA on the same example used in SaS. 




we discuss the aforementioned goals. To avoid repeating tables and figures, we will refer to 
them when necessary. 
 
In table 5.3, we extracted the concepts of the ISSRM [Mayer, 2009], ISRM [Firesmith, 
2003], and SaS domains then dividing these concepts into three categories; Asset-related 
concepts; Risk-related concepts; Risk treatment-related concepts. We find that it is clear 
that the concepts of SaS domain are Risk-related concepts are redundant. 
 
The second goal consists of two parts; in Table 6.1, we see that obstacles are divided into 
six categories. When represented using KAOS, these six categories are reduced to one type 
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that is later built and can be customized as to which obstacles category it belongs to by 
adding annotations (Figure 6.2). secondly, there were clear indications that it affected 
semantic correctness during the alignment process between KAOS elements and SaS 
concepts (Table 6.3). this is due to the fact that each KAOS patterns (a.k.a. Avoid, 
Maintain, Achieve) is met by more than one concept from the SaS domain. This applies to 
the obstacles element since there are six categories (Table 6.1) [Lamsweerde, 2009]. For 
that, we intended to leave it unexplained using a single term {Obstacles} and used an 
explicit term ThreatObstacle that deals with security instead. On the other hand, 
HazardObstacles deals with the safety perspective to support semantic KAOS-SaS in our 
work. 
 
We recall section 6.2 and the appendices B, and C. The results contain differences. These 
differences are due to two reasons: 
The example @RunningSurgery was run using KAOS, which is considered from the GML 
category. KAOS patterns (a.k.a. Avoid, Maintain, Achieve) were used to create obstacle 
models, and derive milestone from it. 
 
7.3 Cases  
 
We compare the results we got from applying KAOS-SaS with the results we have from 
applying the example @RunningSurgery and measure the degree of likelihood using 
STAMP (STPA; STPA-sec).  
 
The same example "@RunningSurgery "was run using STPA and STPA-sec, which are 
considered from the scenario-based category that use textual description of the analysis 
process. Furthermore, the approaches used in the hazard analysis for security (STPA-sec) 
do not differ much from the approaches used in threat analysis for safety. This is clear in 
the phase “Identifying unsafe/unsecure control actions” (Table 7.1) STPA-sec as security 
and safety are inseparable as mentioned by Young [Young and Leveson, 2013; 2014].  
This is due to the fact that STPA-sec does not take into account traditional security 
standards like confidentiality, integrity and availability, which leads to ambiguity around 
the standards to be used when running the example from the security side using STPA-sec. 
however, it has the advantage of being scenario-based because it was helpful using textual 
description. 
 
Table 7. 1 Summary Steps Risk/Hazard Management process for SaS, STPA and STPA-sec. 
SaS STPA STPA-sec 
1-Scope and context asset 
identification 
1-Identify accidents and 
hazard 
1-Determining unacceptable losses 
2-Determination of dependability 
objectives 
2-Construct functional control 
structure 
2-Creating a model of the high level 
control structure- HLCS 




4-Risk treatment 4-Identify causal factors and 
control flaws 




 5-Identifying casual scenarios 
6-Constraint selection and 
implementation 
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7.4 Threat to Validity 
 
Threats of validation varied as follows: 
 The modelling language STPA-sec is still under development and immature. 
Furthermore, references are limited to only one tutorial [Young, 2014] and two 
researches papers that explain the STPA-sec processes [Young and Leveson, 2014; 
2013]. This shows slight effect when running @RemoteSurgery STPA-sec security 
corner. 
 The context of the example @RemoteSurgery addressed in the study (extracted and 
built) from the description of three scientific experiments [Marescaux, et. Al., 2002; 
Anvari et al., 2005; Anvari, 2007; Jumpei et al., 2006] that are affected to a certain 
level with subjectivity. 
 The SaS domain model is immature, which affected alignment between it and 
KAOS. 
 Lack of educational papers on the use of STAMP approach. For that, the example 
@RemoteSurgery was simplified during the alignment process between STAMP 
approach and SaS, which has affected the results. 
 
7.5 Lesson Learn  
 
Hazard/Risk management process was the entry point for the integration process as the 
interface interplays between safety requirements and security requirements from the aspect 
of system functionality and what the system should and should not do. SaS is the result in 
integrating ISRM hazard management and ISSRM risk management. Were aligned of 
between KAOS and SaS domain model. It became possible to analysis safety and security 
in a consistent and using one modelling language tool. 
 
Finally, we would like to conclude that using KAOS in this research was suitable to run the 
experimental researches, and easy to learn as supported by the study conducted by 
[Matulevičius and Heymans   007    oal modeling tool  Objectiver  was used in the 
creation of goal models to give contextualization to these goals  and is rich in element 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion and Future work 
 
We investigated the available information domain models for safety engineering and found 
a domain model ISRM [Firesmith, 2003] that addresses safety engineering, which has 
enriched the understanding of the concepts used in risk management process from the 
safety engineering aspect. Furthermore, we found the ISSRM domain model [Mayer, 2009] 
from the security engineering aspect, which has enriched the understanding of the concepts 
used in risk management process. Therefore, we performed an alignment between KAOS 
and ISRM domain model concepts [Firesmith, 2003], we performed an alignment between 
KAOS and ISSRM [Mayer, 2009] domain concepts. This has resulted in extended coverage 
for the concepts resulting from the integration between safety engineering and security 
engineering in the risk management process and enlisting all of them in a table. 
 
We used KAOS [Lamsweerde, 2009] that is classified under goal-oriented languages. We 
have found that KAOS enables a representation method for security and safety hazard/risk 
management together by used obstacles method. 
 
We propose a solution through the creation of SaS information domain model that 
integrates safety and security domains giving a better opportunity for interplay and 
integration to find a middle ground between the ISRM hazard management and ISSRM risk 
management as well as unifying definitions through their mappings onto the common 





our research thesis was met by limitations. The first limitation was the fact that we were 
talking from a theoretical point of view during the creation of the SaS information model. 
No new metrics were used to enhance the domain, instead, the SaS domain inherited the 
same metrics used in the ISSRM [Mayer, 2009] and ISRM [Firesmith, 2003] domains. 
 
The hazard management process for the SaS domain model is one of our research 
assumptions, used as an input for our research method and is the result of the integration 
between ISSRM process and ISRM process, which are included in our research 
assumptions. 
 
The application of hazard management process for the SaS information domain model 
using KAOS modelling language exclusively. Part of the example @RemoteSurgery that 
overlaps with our research was deducted in order to maintain a certain degree of 
subjectivity.  
 
The STAMP approach is mainly directed to safety engineering in the first place. The STPA 
modelling language was used in the hazard analysis process from the safety perspective 
only. The alignment process between concepts of STAMP approach and SaS information 
domain model mainly relied on a simple and specific scenario that was deducted from the 
example @RunningSurgery. 
The STPA-sec modelling language was used in the hazard analysis process from the 
security perspective. STPA-sec is still under development and validation by Young. The 
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references are limited to only one  tutorial [Young, 2014] and two researches papers that 
explain the STPA-sec processes [Young and Leveson, 2014; 2013]. This shows slight 




This research problem is divided into two research questions for investigation. Now we will 
discuss our answer to these research questions. 
 
RQ1: How could we possibly relate safety and security?  
 
To answer this question we have surveyed and analyzed different hazard/risk management 
process, because it was the entry point for the integration process as the interface interplays 
between safety requirements and security requirements from the aspect of system 
functionality and what the system should and should not do. For that, we proposed the 
creation of an information domain model that integrates between SaS, and the 
implementation of risk management process leading to dependability requirements (safety 
and security). 
 
RQ2: What is meant by extend modeling languages approach for safety and security risk 
management?  
 
We have investigated alignment between the SaS domain models for hazard/risk 
management with the modeling language KAOS, which has given the possibility for a 
better method to derive safety and security requirements in early stages from the beginning 
of the system development life cycle by used obstacles approach. The alignment between 
SaS domain model and KAOS enhances the cooperation and facilitates communication and 
interaction between stakeholders. 
 
 
8.3 Future Work 
 
To enhance the process of deriving the requirements from the user, the researcher [Zapata, 
2013] proposed a method for weighted salience allocation to the KAOS goals and 
requirements specification, based only on the hierarchy level, in the context of the UNC-
Method. Zapata [Zapata, 2013] concludes that the use of UNC-Method closer to the 
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Turvaliste ja ohutute süsteemide arendamine KAOS meetodi kasutamisel 




On spetsiaalsed tehnikad, mida kasutatakse riskihalduses nii turvalisuse kui ohutuse 
konstrueerimise domeenides. Nende tehnikate väljundid, mida tuntakse artefaktidena, on 
üksteisest eraldatud, mis toob kaasa mitmeid probleeme, kuna domeenid on sõltumatud ja 
ei ole domeeni, mis ühendaks neid mõlemat.  
Probleemi keskmes on see, et turvalisus- ja ohutusinsenerid töötavad erinevates 
meeskondades kogu süsteemiarenduse elutsükli jooksul, mille tulemusena riskid ja ohud on 
ebapiisavalt kaetud. 
  
Käesolevas magistritöös rakendatakse struktuurset lähenemist, turvalisuse ja ohutuse 
integreerimiseks läbi SaS (Safety and Security) domeeni mudeli loomise, mis integreerib 
neid mõlemaid. Lisaks töö käigus näidatakse, et on võimalik kasutada eesmärgipõhist 
KAOS (Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Specification) keelt ohtude ja riskide 
analüüsiks, nii et kaetud saavad nii ohutus- kui ka turvadomeen, muutes nende väljundid e. 
artefaktid hästi struktureerituks, mille tulemusena toimub põhjalik analüüs ja suureneb 
usaldatavus. 
 
Me pakume välja lahenduse, mis sisaldab sellise domeeni mudeli loomist, milles on 
integreeritud ohtutuse ja turvalisuse domeenid. See annab parema võrdlus- ja 
integreerimisvõimaluse, leidmaks kahe domeeni vahelise kesktee ning ühendavad 
definitsioonid läbi nende kaardistamise üldises ontoloogias.  
 
Selline lahendus toob kokku turvalisuse ja ohutusedomeenide integratsiooni ühtsesse 
mudelisse, mille tulemusena tekib ohutus- ja turvalisustehnikate vahel vastastikune 
mõjustus ning toodab väljundeid, mida peetakse usaldusartefaktideks ning kasutab KAOSt 
domeeni mudeliga, mis on ehitatud juhtumianalüüsi põhjal. Peale vastloodud mudeli 
rakendumist viiakse läbi katse, milles analüüsitakse sedasama juhtumit, võrdlemaks selle 
tulemusi teiste juba olemasolevate mudelite tulemustega, et uurida sellise domeeni 
mõttekust. 
 
Struktureeritud lähenemine võib seega toimida liidesena, mis lihtsustab aktiivset 
interaktsiooni riski- ja ohuhalduses, aidates leida lahendusi probleemidele ja vastuoludele, 
mille lahendamiseks on vaja integreerida ohutuse ja turvalisuse domeenid ja kasutada 
unifitseeritud süsteemianalüüsi tehnikat, mille tulemusena tekib analüüsi tsentraalsus.  
  
Võtmesõnad  
Ohutusmudel, turvalisusmudel, usaldatavuse nõuded, eesmärgimudel, eesmärgipõhine 
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STAMP approach is explained (Appendix A) in details using SaS information domain 
model elements as well as the details of running the example “@RemoteSurgery” using 
STPA; for safety side, and STPA-sec; for security side STAMP languages techniques can 
be found in (Appendices B, and C). The results of this process are discussed in chapter 7. 
 
We will address the phases of the STPA process from the safety perspective (Appendix B), 
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Appendix A Alignment between the concepts of STAMP 
Approach and SaS domain model  
 
A.1 Explanation STAMP Approach Structure 
 
Figure A.1 shows STAMP a generic hierarchical safety control structure, we address part of 
the description of @RemoteSurgery (Section 1.2) and reflect it on the STAMP domain 
model. 
 
Using the concepts in SaS information domain model (Section 5.2) here to explain 
STAMP; Scenario-based [Young and Leveson, 2013; 2014] (Figure A.1) in a narrative 
way. 
@RemoteSurgery, A surgeon that is well trained on using the console is considered one of 
the important assets. Also, the operation itself as well as the patient who will get the 
operation done using this console. The operation will be performed in a customized 
environment that meets the standards for operations, which is the hospital and its assets. 
Without this environment, no operation can be performed without this environment and 
especially the operations room, which has the necessary tools and the console that the 
trained surgeon will use to perform the operation (Table A.1). 
 
Table A. 1 Potential summery about STAMP Asset. 
Asset Reflection 
Organisational asset Doctors, Operation, Patient 
System asset Surgery consoles, Network connection  
Property Surgery operating room 
Environment Hospital 
 
From a safety criterion perspective, it is more about the tools and the environment that have 
to meet certain standards that comply with MDD, which are as follows: failure tolerance; 
correctness; accuracy; availability (Table 5.1), and human backup element that comes from 
resilience engineering [Hollnagel et al., 2006]. It is an important factor in this medical field 
as it is the surgeon that will make a decision and interact manually in case the system 
becomes out of control. 
 
From a security criterion perspective, we are more concerned about the confidentiality of 
information since it is medical data and being confidential is the normal status. For that, we 
require CIA (Table 5.1)  since confidentiality requires not revealing medical information 
and treatment costs. 
 
MDD [DIRECTIVE 93/42/EEC, 1993] has divided the medical instruments into four 
categories depending on the hazard level. The robotic medical instruments are classified 
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Table A. 2 MDD divides devices into four classes qualitative scales. 
MDD class Hazard Level 
Class I Low risk, 
Class IIa Medium risk 
Class IIb Medium risk 
Class III High risk 
 
According to MDD, risk analysis and hazard identification must be performed in the design 
phase following the Drift Correction principle but since the security side is taken into 
consideration, hazard identification process must be a comprehensive one. The standard 
IEC 1508 [Brazendale, 1995] confirms performing that as well as SIL; Reliability-based 
identification. 
 
A new method has been found, through research that is currently being used to deal with 
unintentional accident and intentional risk in systems that directly interact with the 
environment, like the new generation of nuclear power plants [INL/EXT-09-17139, 2009].  
This method is called Defense in Depth ([Leveson, 2012] used artifact term Systems 
Theory). The systems that use DiD analysis get the results as a preventive plan based on the 
application of more than one safety layer to face more than one accident. These safety 
layers are a result of the nature of the system itself. DiD method can be summarized in four 
essential phases: Prevention, Control, Protection, and Mitigation respectively. It is 
important to mention that this analysis will be performed in compatibility with the 
comprehensive overview specified in dependability goal that in turn affects the 
dependability policy that prioritises the requirements in case of conflict in system 
requirement ([Leveson, 2012; 2013b] used term Constraints; "mean the describe 
limitations on how the goals can be achieved. But requirement mean the behavior required 
to satisfy the system’s goals    
 
In the phase of dependability requirement specification, the execution of both analytic and 
holistic process and using a different technique, each of the components that interact with 
the system to be analysed and the interaction with each of these components relying on 
other components that already exist in the system without separation as well as independent 
analysis of each of these components. These components are (a.k.a hardware, software, 
humans, environment), which gives us a better overview in dealing with hazards and 
treatment plans that work with the dependability goal. 
 
The process of risk treatment is related to cost, which is the result of analyzing the 
dependability goal phase  There’s an inverse relationship  etween cost and safeguard 
requires execution in the system-to-be. The estimated cost resulted from quantitative and 
qualitative analysis for both safety and security requirement (Leveson used term 
Constraints). Theoretically speaking, it is easy to do, but practically, it is very difficult to 
define the suitable safeguards that will be used with safety. For that, we have to keep into 
account the safety policy (this complies to [Leveson, 2012; 2013b] "Conflicts between 
goals and constraints can more easily be identified and resolved if they are distinguished"), 
that will be used in the system-to-be. These policies are used to comply with the 
dependability goal requirements.  
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On the top of the component hierarchy pyramid for the STAMP model (Figure A.1), we 
find congress and legislature, which controls and organizes government regulatory 
agencies; industry and user associations; insurance companies; unions; and courts. In fact, 
there are several cases regarding legally allowing the use of @RemoteSurgery in hospitals. 
Furthermore  insurance companies aren’t into insuring patients who want to have their 
surgery performed using @RemoteSurgery. Similarly, industry associations are developing 
training curriculums to train surgeons on using @RemoteSurgery, giving them tests to 
measure their abilities and certify them. User associations affects the patient acceptance or 
declining the use of @RemoteSurgery. STAMP takes into consideration in the 
sociotechnical cases. 
 






Figure A. 1 STA  ’                                    S    T                                 . 
From [Leveson, 2004]. 
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Appendix B STPA Process for Safety 
 
B.1 STPA Process for Safety  
 
The hazard analysis process in STPA [Leveson, 2012] consists of four essential steps 
(Figure B.1). 
 
a. Identify accidents and hazard 
In this step, we work on defining the scope of the system and the environment, defining 
hazards and potential accidents, and finally, defining the safety constraints. This step 
consists of three sub-steps: System-level Accidents (Losses); System-level Hazards; System-
level Safety Constraints. 
b. Construct functional control structure 
In this step, we plan high-level control structure that explains the main components of the 
system and how it’s lin ed to other components  This would help us understand locations 
of input and output as well as integration and control in a system. 
c. Identify unsafe control actions 
In this step, refinement of high-level safety constraints and requirements using scenario-
base and the narrative description in defining high-level unsafe control actions (Table B.1), 
which helps us put safety requirements and constraints (Table B.2) that are then 
represented in table form. 
Four ways a controller can provide unsafe control (Table B.1): A control action required 
for safety is not provided; An unsafe control action is provided; A potentially safe control 
action is provided too late or too early (at the wrong time) or in the wrong sequence; A 
control action required for safety is stopped too soon or applied too long. 
d.  Identify causal factors and control flaws 
We start by identifying causal factors scenarios leading to violation of safety constraints 
using control loop model (Figure B.2) to identify how each potentially hazardous control 
action identified in Step 3 "Identify unsafe control actions" could occur. 
 
 
Figure B. 1 Steps System-Theoretic Process Analysis for Safety, adapted from [Leveson, 2012]. 
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Too early/too late, 














Table B. 2 Defining Safety Constraints, for example about @RemoteSurgery speed sensor. 
Unsafe Control Actions Safety Constraint 




Figure B. 2 High level basic control structure model for Safety, adapted from [Leveson, 2013b]. 
 
Therefore, we going to put a simple scenario to explain what we’ll  e addressing  efore 
getting into the hazard analysis process for safety (STPA) and security (STPA-sec).  
 
@RemoteSurgery, Most of the focus was on the movement of the operating terminals of the 
main console through which, a surgeon performs the operation. These movements are 
transmitted from one place to another on the network to reach the receiving console where 
the patient is, with no latency that might affect the terminals movement. [Anvari et al., 
2005] conducted an experiment on remote operations to evaluate the consequences of 
latency being 500ms [Marescaux et al., 2000] and concluded that the higher the latency 
value is, the higher the probability of a risk occurring, putting the life of the patient on the 
line. Furthermore, the transmission of high definition photos allows the operating surgeon 
to see everything as if they are performing the operation on the patient directly. Avoiding 
the loss of transmitted packets above the average is also as important as discussed by 
[Marescaux et al., 2000]. This system, like any other system, is vulnerable simply because 
it is connected to the network. 
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The surgeon controls the console; master cart; slave cart, which is a platform that consists 
of robotic arms for control, cameras, and an operating system that is connected to the host 
console through a network. This console could be located anywhere in the world and the 
surgeon sends commands to this console from wherever they are, remotely. The integration 
between conducting surgeries using robots and platform network connectivity leads us to 
find a method to identify potential hazard that will stand in the way of this technology that 
is starting to spread. 
 
In the example, we are dealing with safety/security requirements, where there is no 
possibility for disconnection; availability  between the main console that runs from the 
surgeon’s side and the patient console that receives commands to perform surgery 
operations and since the system is connected to a network, this puts it under new threats 
that need to be dealt with. 
 
 
B.2  Running example- STPA Safety Corner 
 
We apply the four steps of STPA process for safety on the example @RunningSurgery, 
which was addressed from the safety perspective and KAOS-SaS in chapter 6, section 6.2. 
What is addressed in this section will be addressed using STPA. STPA is considered a base 
scenario [Leveson, 2004; 2012]. Therefore, we run the example based on the above. 
 
a. Identify accidents and hazard 
 
Here, we have to answer the following questions, 
 
System-level accidents (losses)? 
Losing connection with the slave console; Losing control on the console; Losing control on 
the robot arms 
System-level Hazards? 
Operating System failure; Software is not responding 
System-level safety constraints? 
Connection to slave console must not be lost; Control on robot arms must not be lost 
Operating software must not fail 
 
b. Construct functional control structure 
 
In this phase, we design the high-level control structure for system-level hazards. 
Here, we focus on the analysis in case the robot arms stopped responding to the operating 
surgeons maneuvers. We have addressed the main components in this analysis according to 
STPA. 
 
Main components of Figure B.3 are, 
SlaveConsoleCart:is the platform that received the movements for the robotic SlaveArms 
to operate on the patient. 
Network: is the means of communication between the two consoles. 
MasterArms: is the arm through which, the operating surgeon performs surgical maneuvers. 
SlaveArms: execute the commands sent from MasterArms on the patient’s  ody directly  
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Figure B. 3 high-level control structure for system-level hazards@RemoteSurgery wrong position x,y,z. 
 
c. Identify unsafe control actions 
 
In this phase, we devise a control table using guide words that describe the cause of hazard 
(Table B.3). 
 









Too early/too late, 









# # # 
surgeon cancels 
surgical maneuvers  
due slave console 
robot arms not 
responding 
 
Now we address the structure of this hazard using structure of a hazardous control action. 
 
 
Four parts of a hazardous control action [Leveson, 2004; 2012]. 
 Source Controller: the controller that can provide the control action 
 Type: whether the control action was provided or not provided 
 Control Action: the controller’s command that was provided / missing 
 Context: conditions for the hazard to occur. 
 
Table B.3 { surgeon => Source Controller; 
cancels => Type; 
surgical maneuvers => Control Action; 
due slave console robot arms not responding => Context } 
 
After that we define safety constrains Table B.4 
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     Table B. 4 Safety constrains @RemoteSurgery wrong position x,y,z. 
Unsafe control actions Safety constraints 
(Table B.3) surgeon cancels surgical maneuvers  
due slave console robot arms not responding 
 
surgeon must not perform Maneuver when 





d. Identify causal factors and control flaws 
 
the operating surgeon performs surgical maneuvers based on what the surgeon sees on the 
monitor on the master slave. This monitor displays images transmitted from the camera on 
the slave console. The robot arms in the slave console perform the commands sent from the 
master console by the operating surgeon. Both consoles are connected through the network. 
The reason behind the slave console robot arm irresponsiveness is due to  Failure in 
operating software that is responsible for robot arms movements. This indicates that safety 
constraints must be put in order to monitor the status of the robot arms and availability of 
feedback for the operating surgeon from the latter to learn the status. 
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Appendix C STPA-sec Process for security 
 
C.1 STPA-sec Process for security 
 
The hazard analysis process in STPA-sec [Young and Leveson, 2013; 2014] consists of 
five phases (Figure C.1). 
 
a. Determining unacceptable losses 
 
From the STPA-sec perspective, this phase is executed at the strategic level to determine 
the context of the system from a comprehensive point of view using a top-down method. In 
this method, the probabilities and definition of all potential assets losses, which are 
considered unacceptable for the organisation. The researcher Young [Young, 2014] used 
“what(s ” and “how” to extract the unaccepta le losses   What(s -what essential services 
and functions must be secured against disruptions or what represents an unacceptable loss". 
After defining services and functions  “How” is used to extract information on how a 
violation occurs for these functions. "How(s) - that can lead to the undesirable outcomes. 
The analysis moves from general to specific, from abstract to concrete". 
The outcome of the first phase is the definition of vulnerabilities and related loss events. 
 
b. Creating a model of the high level control structure- HLCS 
 
We make graphical specification for the system and its components and the internal 
components in a high-level control structure way. The HLCS model is built on a lack of 
constraints. To explain and understand the locations of the main system components and 
how they are inter-connected with other components and the integration and control points 
in the system.  
 
c. Identifying unsafe/unsecure control actions 
 
Using the scenario in (Table C.1) and the narrative description in defining high-level 
unsafe/unsecure control action, and linking that with the outcome of the first phase, 
vulnerabilities, and the outcome of the second phase which explain the linkage between the 
components and controlling the receiving and sending flow. 
There are four types of potential unsafe/unsecure control actions [Young and Leveson, 
2013] (Table C.1): Providing a control action leads to a hazard or exploits the 
vulnerability; Not providing a control action leads to a hazard or exploits a vulnerability; 
Providing control actions too late, too early, or in the wrong order leads to a hazard or 
exploits a vulnerability; Stopping a control action too soon or continuing it too long leads 
to a hazard or exploits vulnerability. 
 
 
d. Developing security requirements and constraints 
 
In this phase, we execute the Refinement of High-Level security Constraints and 
Requirements process using the scenario in (Table C.2) in order to achieve rigorous 
constraints for the system. 
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e. Identifying casual scenarios 
 
We identify causal factors scenarios leading to violation of security constraints using the 
Control Loop domain model (Figure B.2; Appendix B) and identify how each potentially 
hazardous/vulnerable States control action identified in Step c" Identifying 
Unsafe/Unsecure Control Actions" could occur. 
 

























Table C. 2 Defining Security Constraints, for example about @RemoteSurgery speed sensor. 
Unsafe/Unsecure Control Actions Security Constraint 





C.2 Running example- STPA-Sec Security Corner 
 
We apply the five steps of STPA-sec process for security on the example @RemoteSurgery, 
which was addressed from the safety perspective and KAOS-SaS in chapter 6, section 6.2. 
What is addressed in this section will be addressed using STPA-sec. STPA-sec is 
considered a base scenario [Young and Leveson, 2014; 2013]. Therefore, we run the 
example based on the above. 
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a. Determining unacceptable losses 
 
Here, we have to answer the following questions, 
 
system-level accidents (losses)? 
Losing connection with the slave console; Losing control on the console; Patient is 
bleeding. 
System-level hazard? 
Latency in images transmission. 
System-level safety constraints? 
Latency value must not exceed an agreed level (value of x ms). 
 
b. Creating a model of the high level control structure (HLCS) 
 
In this phase, we design the high-level control structure for system-level hazards. 
 
Here, we focus the analysis on the latency in transmitting imaged to the operating surgeon. 
We only presented the main components in the analysis according to STPA. 
 
Components of Figure C.2 are, 
 
MasterConsoleCart: is the platform that transmits the movements the operating surgeon is 
making according to what is being seen on the master console monitor that displays images 
transmitted from the slave console on the patient’s end  
SlaveConsoleCart: is the platform that received the movements for the robotic arms to 
operate on the patient. 
Camera: is placed inside the patient’s  ody and transmits images to the operating surgeon 
displayed on the monitor. 
Network: is the means of communication between the two consoles. 
 
 
Figure C. 2 high-level control structure for system-level hazards @RemoteSurgery camera latency. 
 
c. Identifying unsafe/unsecure control actions 
 
In this phase, we devise a control table using guide words that describe the cause of hazard 
(Table C.3). 
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Unsafe/Unsecure Control Actions camera latency 
Not providing 
causes hazard 
Providing causes hazard 












surgical maneuvers  due 







Now we address the structure of this hazard using structure of a hazardous control action. 
  
Four parts of a hazardous control action [Leveson, 2004; 2012]. 
 
 Source Controller the controller that can provide the control action 
 Type whether the control action was provided or not provided 
 Control Action the controller’s command that was provided / missing 
 Context conditions for the hazard to occur. 
 
Table C.3 { surgeon => Source Controller; 
performs => Type; 
surgical maneuvers => Control Action; 
due to image transmission latency => Context } 
 
d. Developing security requirements and constraints 
 
After that we define security/safety constrains Table C.4 
 
Table C. 4 Security/Safety constrains @RemoteSurgery camera latency. 
Unsafe/Unsecure Control Actions Security/Safety Constraint 
(Table C.3) surgeon performs surgical 
maneuvers  due to image transmission 
latency 
operating surgeon performs surgical 
maneuvers when image transmission latency 
is less than X ms. 
 
 
e. Identifying casual scenarios 
 
The operating surgeon performs surgical maneuvers based on what the surgeon sees on the 
monitor on the master slave. This monitor displays images transmitted from the camera on 
the slave console. The robot arms in the slave console perform the commands sent from the 
master console by the operating surgeon. Both consoles are connected through the network. 
The reason  ehind the latency in transmitting images to the operating surgeon’s monitor is 
due to the latency in transmitting data packets above the allowed average value X, which 
leads to another hazard; unharmonious surgical maneuvers that could lead to an accident in 
the end. 
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